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The cities and towns of France were swept last year by
waves of strikes and demonstrations.' Each wave of nationwide
protest typically brought more than one million people into the
streets.2 Demonstrations at times turned violent, with march-
ers throwing bottles, stones, and other objects at the police,
who in turn responded with tear gas and arrests.3 People were
injured; property was destroyed.4 Strikes that accompanied the
protests disrupted French daily life: flights were cancelled,
ground transportation services operated haphazardly, and uni-
versities, schools, offices, and shops closed their doors. Even
one of France's most famous symbols, the Eiffel Tower, shut
down during the demonstrations. 5 The trigger that provoked
this rage and set off the social unrest was a seemingly modest
legislative initiative: a new labor law that changed the status of
workers under the age of twenty-six by permitting employers to
fire them without cause during their first two years of employ-
1. See, e.g., Editorial, Everybody Loses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/04/ll/opinion/lltue4.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2007);
Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Will Rescind Labor Law That Caused Wide French
Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at Al; Elaine Sciolino & Craig S. Smith,
French Premier Refuses to Bow to Protests by Angry Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2006, at A8; Craig S. Smith, French Unrest Reflects Old Faith in Quasi-
Socialist Ideals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, at 10.
2. Sciolino & Smith, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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ment.6 Both the unions and the majority of the French popula-
tion supported the wide civil protest, which resulted in the
summary repeal of the law. 7
At first glance, the severity and magnitude of the reaction
to the legislation seems puzzling. The government declared
that the law's aim was to combat unemployment and encourage
the hiring of young people.8 Arguably, employers would be less
hesitant to hire young, inexperienced workers if they were as-
sured the flexibility of being able to discharge them with ease.
Consequently, more young people would be given the chance to
prove their abilities. 9 Repealing the labor law and requiring
just cause for dismissal, so the argument goes, would result in
fewer jobs for the young.10 Since more employment is better
than less, the demonstrators' victory was illusory and the con-
dition of young workers as a group actually worsened. How
could the protestors not see this?
I submit that the demonstrators were not fools or popul-
ists-rather, they understood the tradeoffs their struggle in-
volved. Indeed, the connection between easy firing and in-
creased employment was not kept secret, but pervaded the
public discussion.1 ' What the outraged protestors rejected, I be-
lieve, was the notion that "more" employment is necessarily
better than "less." In essence, their behavior conveyed the fol-
lowing message: it is better not to be hired at all than to be
hired and then discarded on a whim, without being deemed
worthy of a reasonable explanation. 12
6. French law, in contrast to American labor law, does not adopt an em-
ployment at-will regime and generally protects employees against unjust ter-
mination of their contract. Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 510 (1976). For a dis-
cussion of the two employment regimes, see infra notes 305-15 and accompa-
nying text. The new French legislation constituted a move to an at-will scheme
for the first two years of a young person's employment.
7. Editorial, supra note 1; Sciolino, supra note 1.
8. Smith, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Editorial, supra note 1.
11. Id.; Sciolino, supra note 1.
12. I do not argue that restrictions on unjust dismissal would necessarily
reduce employment rates, nor that one always faces a stark choice between
inferior hiring terms and fewer employment opportunities. Actual outcomes in
the labor market are determined by many variables, and policymakers may
take measures to increase the employability of workers or employment rates.
See infra note 315 (discussing possible effects of minimal labor contract
terms). I do claim that even if just-cause clauses would result in less employ-
ment of young workers, this outcome may be regarded as superior to working
[92:634
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This Article expands on the counterintuitive idea that
"more is not always better than less." The conventional view
that "more is better than less" (MBL) often underlies our ar-
guments and assumptions regarding legal rules. It supports the
belief that the ability to carry out an extreme measure with re-
spect to property includes the power to take a more moderate
measure. 13 For example, scholars have claimed that since own-
ers are free not to transfer their assets to descendants-but ra-
ther destroy or sell them before death-then they should be
able to bequeath their assets subject to conditions. 14 As it is
implicitly assumed that more property is better than less, it is
better to inherit property that comes subject to restrictions
than not to inherit at all. Therefore, so the argument goes, the
law should not interfere with testamentary freedom, because
such intervention would give donors an incentive to destroy,
deplete, or sell resources during their lifetime to the detriment
of their potential beneficiaries.1 5
The MBL rationale is implicit in other property law con-
texts as well. For instance, scholars usually assume that the
right to use one's property implies the freedom not to use it.16
When a property owner exercises her right, she burdens the
persons who must respect her right and suffer the conse-
quences of its use.17 Nonuse, therefore, means more freedom to
others. Since more freedom is better than less, the greater en-
titlement to exercise a property right intensively should fold
within it the lesser entitlement not to exercise it.18
This Article has two major goals. The first is to demon-
strate that in fact numerous rules in a variety of legal contexts
reject the MBL argument. 19 Moderate measures are often less
tolerated than extreme ones. Thus, for example, intensive exer-
cise of a right may be permitted, whereas nonuse results in its
under humiliating or degrading conditions. For further elaboration, see infra
notes 310-15 and accompanying text.
13. Richard A. Epstein, Rights and "Rights Talk," 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106,
1109 (1992) (book review).
14. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in
the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705 (1986).
15. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 548-49 (7th ed.
2007).
16. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Pos-
session, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1130 (1985).
17. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part I.B.
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loss; 20 destruction of property may be allowed, even when its
modification is forbidden; 2 1 total inalienability may be re-
spected, yet restrictions on alienability struck down.22
The second goal of the Article is to demonstrate that this
seemingly puzzling state of affairs has sound justifications.
These justifications rest on both normative analysis and in-
sights from behavioral studies. In particular, I argue that mod-
erate measures may generate more harm to other people's wel-
fare than extreme ones, that moderate measures are more
likely to induce mistakes and misconceptions in others, and
that the very use of moderate measures may be a good proxy
for strategic behavior or low valuation. I contend that extreme
measures are less subject to inefficiencies and more likely to be
a product of careful thought, and that moderate measures can
be indicative of distributive errors that require correction. By
granting greater deference to extreme measures, legal rules
enhance welfare, reduce mistakes and cognitive biases, and fa-
cilitate the transfer of assets to those who value or need them
more.
The suggested reasons for rejecting the MBL argument can
serve as a yardstick for supporting or critiquing existing rules.
Thus the Article justifies property law rules that terminate un-
used trademarks but not unused copyrights and patents, and
that rein in speculation in domain names but not in land. At
the same time, this Article criticizes the prevailing rule that
does not regard lengthy nonuse as sufficient in itself to extin-
guish servitudes. Finally, the Article illustrates how the analy-
sis presented here is equally valid in other legal fields, such as
labor law, zoning law, and contract law.
Part I of the Article introduces the conundrum that the Ar-
ticle addresses. Part L.A explains the MBL argument and its in-
tuitive appeal. Part I.B demonstrates the refutation of this ar-
gument in diverse rules of property law. These illustrations
span the whole gamut of property law: "regular" and intellec-
tual property; real and personal property; tangible and intangi-
ble property. This Part presents rules conflicting with the MBL
rationale, and rejects the conventional rationalizations that the
20. As is the case with trademarks, rent-controlled housing, and water
rights. See infra notes 65-100 and accompanying text.
21. As demonstrated by the legal protection of authors' moral rights. See
infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
22. As is the case with restrictions on alienation by tenants. See infra
notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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literature provides for them. Part II offers justifications for the
idea that more may not be better than less. Specifically, three
arguments are advanced in support of greater scrutiny and in-
tervention in the case of moderate, rather than extreme, meas-
ures with respect to property rights: protecting potential prop-
erty transferees; reducing the incidence of low-valuing owners;
and correcting distributive errors. Part II.D then articulates
the conclusions and policy implications of the discussion. Part
III demonstrates how the justifications underpinning statutory
or judicial restriction of more moderate measures are applica-
ble beyond the realm of property law.
I. THE ARGUMENT FOR WIDE OWNERSHIP DISCRETION
AND ITS PUZZLING REFUTATIONS
Arguments based on the view that "more is better than
less" are prevalent in property law. Nonetheless, many well-
established property rules do not follow the MBL rationale. The
conventional explanations for these rules are not persuasive.
A. THE BASIC ARGUMENT, ITS APPEAL, AND ITS UNDERLYING
PREMISE
A familiar argument with respect to property is that the
right to carry out an extreme measure encompasses also the
power to take a more moderate one. If an owner may freely de-
stroy, consume, or sell an asset before her death, 23 thereby
completely denying it to her descendents, then she can surely
bequeath the asset subject to restrictions. Richard Epstein put
it clearly: "If I needn't convey at all, than [sic] I can convey sub-
ject to whatever restrictions I choose."24 Similarly, since an
23. Generally speaking, the right of ownership includes the liberty to con-
sume or destroy the thing owned as well as the right to alienate it both in life
and upon death. A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 118 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
24. Epstein, supra note 14, at 705; see also STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 68-69 (2004) (equating a living
owner's consumption decisions regarding her property with her decisions to
control the property after death, and explaining how the costs associated with
both decisions are internalized in each, resulting in efficient outcomes); Jeffrey
E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 TUL.
L. REV. 705, 754 (1990) (noting that a person is free to destroy his Rolls Royce
car despite the loss his descendants will consequently suffer); Symposium,
Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law: Round Table Discussion, 64
WASH. U. L.Q. 793, 843 (1986) [hereinafter Round Table Discussion] (remarks
of Jack Carr) ("If I can destroy [assets such as my house or car], then why
can't I tie [them] up in the future?").
2008] 639
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owner is entitled to entirely exclude others from entering her
land, she may also allow only partial or conditional entrance or
simply regulate the property's disposition and use.25 The same
argument potentially applies to any type and means of property
transfer: whether inter vivos or mortis causa; contractual or
testamentary; by way of a trust or through the creation of an
easement. In all these cases it can equally be claimed, that the
right not to transfer includes the right to transfer subject to re-
strictions.
The force of this argument rests on the effects of extreme
and moderate measures on others. The underlying assumption
is that employing the greater power would be worse for the af-
fected individuals than exercising the lesser power (and that
the latter does not inflict external harms on others).26 In the
context of bequests, for instance, it is implicitly assumed that it
is better to inherit property subject to conditions than not to
inherit at all. 27 More property is better than less; some property
better than none.
For this very reason, scholars often warn against legal in-
terference with testamentary freedom. Attempts to curtail
dead-hand control, so the argument goes, would create incen-
tives to destroy, deplete, or sell resources during the testator's
lifetime.28 Consequently, less wealth will be left upon death, to
the detriment of prospective beneficiaries. 29 The case for
25. Epstein, supra note 13, at 1109 ("The greater power to exclude in-
cludes the lesser power to admit on conditions, [and an owner's ability to set
her price and refuse to sell for a lower one] carries over to other terms as well,
including terms regulating financing and use.").
26. Epstein, supra note 14, at 705. If the "moderate" measure involves un-
internalized negative externalities then it may be, in fact, the less moderate of
the two, or even inefficient in itself.
27. POSNER, supra note 15, at 548-49.
28. Id. at 549.
29. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 158 (4th ed.
2004); Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1465, 1474 (1989); Stake, supra note 24, at 749-50. Annuities exacerbate this
problem, because they enable owners to consume or disperse their assets while
alive and, at the same time, secure their own economic comfort until death.
See SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 61-62 (explaining how annuities can guaran-
tee people sufficient funds during their life while enabling them to refrain
from leaving a significant estate upon death); Stake, supra note 24, at 750
(same); see also Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Com-
ments on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1413
(1982) (noting, in the context of servitudes, that striking down covenants re-
stricting alteration or demolition of buildings using the changed conditions
doctrine may deter developers from building in the first place). Indeed, land is
a spatial asset that cannot be utterly destroyed, and thus must pass to some-
[92:634640
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upholding restrictions on property is further strengthened by
the fact that the recipients may always reject the conditioned
bequest and acquire unrestricted property on their own, if they
happen to prefer the latter option. 30
The MBL notion is not limited to the context of conditioned
or partial transfers. It is implicit in other areas of property law
as well. One of the most important rights in a property owner's
bundle is the right to use the asset.3 1 The very idea of a right or
liberty-as opposed to a duty-to use implies that the owner is
free not to use her property. 32 The MBL argument easily pro-
vides an explanation: when a property owner exercises her
right to use her property, she unavoidably burdens other
people-those who must respect her right and suffer the conse-
quences of its use.33 For example, in the case of a right of way,
the more the easement owner exercises her right, the greater
the burden imposed on the servient landowner. Nonintensive
use or nonuse by the easement holder means more freedom to
the landowner to enjoy her property as she pleases. It is there-
fore unsurprising that scholarly writing focuses on the more
burdensome right to use property, which generates the problem
of harmful uses.34
one on its owner's death. Consequently, curtailment of testamentary freedom
should not reduce the total amount of available land. It is still true, however,
that striking down testators' conditions may lead owners to transfer the land
during their lifetime, thereby denying it to their descendents. Descendants
might have received more property were the conditions upheld.
30. Epstein, supra note 14, at 704-05.
31. Honor6, supra note 23, at 116 ("[The] right (liberty) to use at one's dis-
cretion has rightly been recognized as a cardinal feature of ownership.").
32. Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Ad-
verse Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037, 1064 (2006) ("[O]wnership impor-
tantly encompasses the prerogative to use or not use the land as one pleas-
es."); Merrill, supra note 16, at 1130 (claiming that an owner's right to use his
property as he wishes so long as he does not injure others should also include
the right to "ignore the property, if by ignoring it he does not injure others").
As Wesley Hohfeld famously claimed, a "duty" is the jural opposite of a privi-
lege or liberty. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30, 32, 36, 41 (1913); see also
Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 828
(1993) ("To have a privilege means that one is at liberty to do the act in ques-
tion.").
33. Hohfeld, supra note 32, at 36-37.
34. For example, Honor6's well known essay on ownership discusses an
owner's right or liberty to use the property at her discretion. Honor6, supra
note 23, at 113, 116. The only qualification Honor6 mentions is the prohibition
on harmful uses. Id. at 123; see also JOSEPH W. SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO
PROPERTY 7 (2d ed. 2005) ("[Olwners are generally free to use their property
as they wish, but they are not free to harm their neighbors' property substan-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The argument that the power of owners to carry out ex-
treme measures with respect to their property includes the
power to engage in more moderate actions accords with com-
mon sense, and seems persuasive. Moderate measures result in
more property or more freedom to others, who are consequently
better off than they would be if extreme measures were taken.
At the same time, allowing property owners wide discretion to
opt for moderate measures also enhances their autonomy and
freedom. Put differently, the argument's attractiveness stems
from what appears to be a Pareto improvement: no one is made
worse off by a shift from an extreme to a moderate measure
with respect to property, and at least some people (if not all
those affected) are made better off.35
The MBL argument has clear policy implications for the
regulation of private property. Generally speaking, owners
should be allowed greater liberty to pursue moderate measures
with respect to their property. Nonuse and conditioned transfer
of property rights should be less interfered with by the law
than extreme measures such as destruction and total inaliena-
bility. At the very least, similar rules should apply to extreme
and moderate measures, granting equal discretionary powers to
property owners with respect to both of them.
Surprisingly, property law does not always follow these
principles. Moderate measures are often less tolerated than ex-
treme ones. Such rules seem to apply an opposite policy, name-
ly, that owners should have more freedom to use property than
not to use it; more power to destroy property than to modify or
neglect it; greater liberty to not transfer property than to trans-
fer it conditionally, and so on.
This Article argues that this phenomenon, which seems
puzzling, is in fact sound legal policy. The next Part lays down
the basis for the discussion, by demonstrating the ways in
which the MBL argument is implicitly rejected in a variety of
contexts in property law, and exposing the shortcomings of con-
ventional explanations for these rules. Only on that basis will
tially and unreasonably."); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY 27 (1988) (stating that a property owner has "a legal liberty to use it
in certain ways"). Thus, the liberty not to use property is taken for granted as
naturally included in the greater-and more burdensome to others-liberty to
use property as one wishes.
35. A change is Pareto-efficient (or a Pareto improvement) if it makes at
least one person better off and no person worse off. ALLAN FELDMAN,
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 140-42 (1980).
[92:634
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we be able to offer alternative justifications for this phenome-
non.
B. REJECTIONS OF THE 'MORE Is BETTER THAN LESS"
ARGUMENT
Notwithstanding the natural, intuitive appeal of the MBL
argument, it is often rejected in specific legal rules. The follow-
ing illustrations were selected with an eye to variety. They
span the whole gamut of property law: "regular" and intellec-
tual property; real and personal property; tangible and intangi-
ble property.36
1. Nontransfer Versus Conditioned Transfer
Rules preferring nontransfer over conditioned transfer con-
tradict the MBL rationale. Examples of such rules can be found
36. An explanation of why I will not discuss the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine may be in order. In a nutshell, this doctrine holds that "govern-
ment may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit alto-
gether." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV.
1413, 1415 (1989). Accordingly, the government's greater power to deny a cer-
tain benefit does not include the lesser power to impose any condition on its
receipt, if such conditioning attempts to achieve indirectly what the govern-
ment may not do directly. Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7-8
(1988); see also Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Re-
thinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473,
485-504 (1991) (critically examining prevailing theoretical explanations for
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine). I will not discuss the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine for various reasons. First, this doctrine focuses on
the legitimate powers of the grantor-state and on the state's attempt to curtail
or burden such constitutional rights as substantive due process, freedom of
speech, or freedom of religion. Sullivan, supra, at 1415-16. In contrast, I con-
centrate on relationships between individuals with respect to private property
which usually do not threaten constitutional rights or impose significant nega-
tive externalities. Second, my focus is on the grantees of certain benefits, in
order to explain why receiving less property may be better than receiving
more. Although unconstitutional conditions are sometimes identified and inva-
lidated also in specific, narrow private settings, such as with respect to racial-
ly restrictive covenants, the main relevance of the doctrine is in the public
realm. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000) ("[T]here are few cases holding that
enforcement of particular servitudes, other than racial covenants, is prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment ...."). Third, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, as its name clearly indicates, deals only with certain problematic
conditions. This Article, in contrast, exposes and rejects MBL arguments in
additional and wider contexts that include, for instance, nonuse of property
and destruction or modification of property.
20081
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in the laws governing donative transfers and alienation by ten-
ants.
a. Donative Transfers
The law of donative transfers is a particularly appropriate
field to examine the MBL argument. Indeed, the argument
seems at its strongest when applied to gratuitous giving, either
by the living or after death. In general, an owner is under no
obligation to bestow her property as a gift in her lifetime, or to
bequeath it to a particular person upon death.37 Any property
the owner decides to transfer, albeit with restrictions, can be
viewed as a windfall to the beneficiary, to be assessed from a
"zero-property" baseline. The intended recipient is not parting
with anything in return for the conditional gift or bequest, so
no fairness or "consumerist" concern for lack of equivalence in
the parties' respective considerations arises. At the same time,
the beneficiary need not accept the property. 38
One would therefore expect the law not to interfere with
conditioned donative transfers, as long as no illegalities or sig-
nificant harmful externalities are involved. This is not, howev-
er, the case. Though the owner could legally have chosen not to
donate the property at all-but rather to destroy, sell, or oth-
erwise dispose of it-her freedom to transfer it subject to re-
strictions is highly curtailed.
37. This is especially true with respect to American law, which grants tes-
tators considerable freedom to disinherit their close relatives (with the partial
exception of the spouse). See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Re-
designing the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 304-
05 (1987) ("America is uniquely the land of testamentary freedom. In none
other of the world's great legal systems would you be so free to choose whom
you want to receive your property when you die."); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Post-
humous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on
Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1277 ("One may
disinherit family members for any reason at all, however arbitrary or even
hateful the reason may be; unconditional testamentary dispositions are not
subjected to any 'reasonableness' standard."). Continental law, in contrast, af-
fords substantial protection to testators' children and other blood relatives by
entitling them to a reserved portion of the estate. 11 AUBRY & RAU, DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS §§ 679-81 (Paul Esmein ed., 6th ed. 1956), in 3 CIVIL LAW
TRANSLATIONS (Carlos E. Lazarus trans., 1969); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 240-50 (1989); 10 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY § 88.12(c)(1) (David A. Thomas ed., 2d Thomas ed. 1998).
38. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 14, at 705 ("If the grantee does not like
the restrictions, there is an easy out: he can reject the gift and acquire his own
property by purchase and thus obtain absolute control over it.").
[92:634644
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For example, conditions pertaining to the recipient's per-
sonal conduct 39 have sometimes been held invalid as being
against public policy. 40 Thus, a court struck down a restraint in
a will that conditioned a cash bequest to four of six siblings, on
their having no communication with the other two. 41 Similarly,
a condition may be invalidated if it aims at preventing the be-
neficiary from ever marrying, 42 inducing divorce or separation
from a spouse,43 or otherwise unreasonably limiting the choice
of spouse.44 Courts have also struck down conditions that re-
quired the adoption or abandonment of a particular religious
faith,45 or excessively interfered in, or limited, career choices. 46
39. Conditions regarding beneficiaries' personal conduct are an appropri-
ate test case for the MBL argument, because they involve neither illegality nor
negative externalities, in contrast to racial restrictions with respect to the dis-
position or use of property. See SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 71 (stating that a
racial restriction on the use of property causes harmful external effects by in-
creasing feelings of separateness in the population and causing social friction);
Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 620-21 (1985) (explaining that
servitudes prohibiting the sale or lease of land to racial minorities affect per-
sons not party to the contract, and by restricting the choices available to mi-
nority buyers and renters such servitudes may increase their housing costs).
Personal conduct conditions are thus a "clean" example of restrictions on prop-
erty that directly affect mainly the parties to the transaction.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 (1983);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) (2003) (stating that a trust
provision is invalid if "it is contrary to public policy").
41. Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 20 A.2d 21, 37 (N.J. Ch. 1941); see also
Estate of Romero v. Nott, 847 P.2d 319, 321-23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (voiding
a condition that discouraged children from living with their mother, the testa-
tor's former wife).
42. Knost v. Knost, 129 S.W. 665, 665 (Mo. 1910); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 (1983); 2 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 37, § 20.13.
43. In re Estate of Gerbing, 337 N.E.2d 29, 35 (Ill. 1975); In re Estate of
Agnew, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1012 (Sur. Ct. 1957); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 29(c) cmt. j (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS §§ 7.1-7.2 (1983); 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 37,
§ 20.13, at 917; Sherman, supra note 37, at 1308.
44. The condition is deemed unreasonable if a marriage permissible under
it is not likely to occur. For example, a condition requiring that the beneficiary
marry a certain person or that a religious recipient marry someone outside her
faith would be unreasonable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 6.2 & cmts. b-c (1983). Unproblematic conditions include, for ex-
ample, those inducing the support and care for particular persons, or the ac-
quisition of a certain level of education. Id. §§ 5.1 cmt. b, 8.3 illus. 2.
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) cmt. k (2003).
46. Id. § 29(c) cmt. 1 (conditioning a bequest on the adoption or abandon-
ment of a particular profession (such as being a surgeon) may be deemed
invalid); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3
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Scholarly attempts to rationalize intervention with condi-
tioned transfers have focused on the issue of dead-hand control.
The main justification advanced in the literature is the high
transaction costs involved in enforcing testators' conditions. 47
In particular, as time goes by and as heirs-owners multiply, it
may be extremely difficult to implement or modify outdated re-
strictions.48
The transaction costs rationale does not satisfactorily ex-
plain the curtailment of conditioned transfers. First, there are
various legal mechanisms that enable the adjustment of re-
strictions to changed circumstances. These are commonly pro-
vided for in advance by the donors themselves (for example, by
inclusion of appropriate provisions in the will or trust docu-
ments), 49 or, in their absence, supplied externally by the law.50
From a transaction costs perspective, it seems preferable to use
such nuanced mechanisms if and when needed, rather than to
invalidate categories of restrictions wholesale.
(1983) (upholding education and occupation restrictions). It should be noted,
however, that the cases discussed in the reporter's notes did not involve signif-
icant limitations on the professional possibilities open to beneficiaries.
47. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 70 (discussing "the cost and im-
practicality" of arranging dead-hand control of property as a "valid argument"
against it); Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two
Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 736
(1986) (noting that the transaction costs of dead-hand control rise over time
and serve as a justification for phasing out dead-hand control).
48. POSNER, supra note 15, at 544-46; SHAVELL supra note 24, at 70-71;
Ellickson, supra note 47, at 736-37.
49. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 714-21 (discussing change mechanisms
in trusts, condominiums, cooperatives, and corporations); Richard A. Epstein,
Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1353, 1365-66 (1982) (arguing, in the context of servitudes, that the original
parties' ability to include change mechanisms, if they so desire, when the ser-
vitude is created, renders the changed conditions doctrine redundant); Ronald
C. Link, The Rule Against Perpetuities in North Carolina, 57 N.C. L. REV. 727,
820-26 (1979) (advocating abolition of the rule against perpetuities and ex-
plaining other ways to limit dead-hand control); Jonathan R. Macey, Private
Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 307-09 (1988)
(criticizing the rule against perpetuities, and claiming that people creating
trusts are rational and thus will take the possibility of unforeseen contingen-
cies into account); Round Table Discussion, supra note 24, at 849-51 (remarks
of Richard Epstein) (addressing various ways to deal with changed circums-
tances, such as creation of a charitable foundation).
50. A prime example is the cy pres doctrine, which enables courts to modi-
fy provisions in wills and trusts that have become impossible or impracticable
to execute, so as to carry out the transferor's charitable intent as closely as
possible. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); RONALD CHESTER ET
AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 431, 433, 438-439 (3d ed. 2005).
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Second, and more importantly, the problem of transaction
costs is relevant mainly to long-term restrictions. When a con-
dition must be met in the near future, there is little fear that
circumstances will change so much by that time as to require
its modification. Yet the rules discussed above apply equally to
long-term and short-term restrictions, and are not contingent
on any proof that circumstances have changed. Thus, for in-
stance, a condition that the beneficiary must marry a specific
person within three years in order to enjoy the property is
deemed invalid from the outset. 51 Moreover, even if one be-
lieves that unforeseen circumstances are a significant risk in
the case of short-term testamentary restrictions, this concern is
inapplicable to inter vivos transfers. 52 Since the donor is still
alive when the time for complying with the restriction ap-
proaches, she can decide whether there is reason to modify or
waive the restrictions. Indeed, the literature justifying curtail-
ing of dead-hand control often relies on the fact that the origi-
nal owner cannot be consulted with respect to the changed cir-
cumstances, whereas a living donor can be approached and
convinced to change her mind.53 To conclude, transaction costs
cannot explain the legal aversion to certain conditions in gra-
tuitous transfers, which apply equally to inter vivos and post-
humous transfers. At most, "transaction costs" justify interven-
tionist legal rules that target distant-future restrictions
exclusively, such as the rule against perpetuities. 54
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (1983).
52. Cf. POSNER, supra note 15, at 546 (noting that there is a stronger case
for intervention in wills than in contracts, because "[clontracts can be mod-
ified, but a person cannot modify the terms of his will after he's dead").
53. Id. at 548 (stating, with respect to a trust conditioned on a son's mar-
rying a Jewish woman by the age of twenty-five, that "[a]s the deadline ap-
proached, the son might come to his father and persuade him that a diligent
search had revealed no marriageable Jewish girl that would accept him. The
father might be persuaded to grant an extension or otherwise relax the condi-
tion"); SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 71 ("[T]he dead cannot be told of difficulties
that arise and cannot give permission to alter the terms of their arrange-
ments .... [I]f a person now alive is using land as a memorial to his dead cat
and the land becomes very valuable, he can be asked and perhaps convinced to
sell it."); Round Table Discussion, supra note 24, at 844-45 (remarks of Tho-
mas Merrill) (contrasting inter vivos and posthumous restrictions in terms of
the possibility for renegotiation).
54. In general, the rule against perpetuities invalidates future interests
that will vest or terminate at too remote a time by limiting the creation of an
interest chain to a maximum of two generations. See generally Jesse Duke-
minier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1867 (1986); Adam J.
Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND.
L.J. 50 (1992); Stake, supra note 24.
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b. Restraints on Alienation by Tenant
An important issue in landlord-tenant relations is the abil-
ity of tenants to transfer their leases. Leaseholds are property
rights, and as such are ordinarily transferable. 55 Landlords,
however, have property rights too, and a legitimate interest in
determining the identity of their tenants. The landlord, for in-
stance, may wish to ensure that the apartment will be kept in
good condition or that the tenant is financially sound and will
pay the rent on time.56 Consequently, lease agreements often
contain clauses restricting the tenant's right to assign the lease
or sublet the apartment.57
Examination of landlord-tenant rules on this issue reveals
that, curiously, the harshest and most one-sided restrictions on
alienation are upheld, while more lenient restrictions are sub-
ject to closer scrutiny and greater intervention. The most ex-
treme restrictions absolutely prohibit any alienation by te-
nants. Such restrictions are generally enforceable.58 Accor-
dingly, the landlord enjoys complete discretion, and her reasons
for prohibiting alienation are not examined. If the contract,
however, is more considerate of the tenant's interests and per-
mits alienation provided certain conditions are met, the lan-
dlord's subsequent refusal may be examined and overruled.
Take, for example, a clause permitting alienation provided the
landlord grants consent. Courts often interpret such clauses as
implying a requirement of reasonableness. 59 The landlord must
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.1
(1977); 1 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 290 (4th ed. 1997);
ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 8:10, at
552, § 8:15, at 578 (1980 & Cumm. Supp. 2007); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Correct-
ly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward
a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. REV. 751, 756 (1988).
56. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 284; SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 55,
§ 8:15, at 578-79; SINGER, supra note 34, at 497.
57. In the following discussion, I use the terms "transfer" and "alienation"
to include both assignment of the lease and subletting.
58. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 321; Johnson, supra note 55, at 756-57;
Martha Wach, Note, Withholding Consent to Alienate: If Your Landlord Is in a
Bad Mood, Can He Prevent You from Alienating Your Lease?, 43 DUKE L.J.
671, 672 (1993); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1995.230 (West 1985 & Supp. 2007)
("A restriction on transfer of a tenant's interest in a lease may absolutely pro-
hibit transfer."); SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 55, § 8:10, at 552 ("[It is not consi-
dered against public policy for the parties to a lease to restrict or prohibit the
alienability of the tenant's interest either absolutely or without consent of the
lessor.").
59. Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 849 (Cal. 1985) (holding
that when a commercial lease conditions assignment on the prior consent of
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consent to the proposed new tenant unless she has a reasonable
basis for refusal.60 Reasonable objections typically relate to ob-
jective factors, such as the financial responsibility of the pro-
posed tenant, the legality of the intended use of the property, or
the extent of alterations needed by the new tenant. 61 In con-
trast, "subjective" reasons-such as those pertaining to race,
religion, ideology, tastes and beliefs-are usually deemed unac-
ceptable. 62 Thus, when the lease agreement places moderate-
rather than extreme-restrictions on assignment by the tenant,
there is a greater chance that the landlord will be required to
defend her decision and ultimately forced to accept a tenant she
opposes.
The disparate treatment of prohibitions and conditional
alienations is puzzling. A tenant may wish to assign her lease-
hold when she no longer needs the premises or is no longer able
to use them, or when a third party values them more highly. If
one believes that a reasonableness requirement is justified be-
cause it removes excessive obstacles to efficient transfers, then
a similar requirement should apply to leases prohibiting as-
signment altogether. Alternatively, if one holds that the rea-
sonableness requirement is redundant because the principle of
mitigation of damages gives landlords ample incentive to find
an efficient replacement for the original tenant, 63 then the re-
the lessor, "such consent may be withheld only where the lessor has a com-
mercially reasonable objection to the assignee or the proposed use"); Cafeteria
Operators L.P. v. AMCAP/Denver Ltd. P'ship, 972 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1998) ("[W]ithout a freely negotiated provision in the lease giving the
landlord an absolute right to withhold consent, a landlord's decision to with-
hold consent must be reasonable."); 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 325.
60. 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 325.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.2 cmt.
g (1977); 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 340-43; SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 55,
§ 8:15, at 581-82; 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 37,
§ 42.04(b)(3)(iii); Johnson, supra note 55, at 760; Wach, supra note 58, at 691-
94.
62. Am. Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Found., Inc., 297 N.Y.S.2d 156,
160-61 (Sup. Ct. 1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND
TENANT § 15.2 cmt. g (1977); 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 344.
63. Although the original tenant may vacate the apartment in response to
the landlord's refusal to grant consent, the mitigation of damages principle
would deny the landlord rent for the period exceeding the reasonable time for
finding a new tenant. 2 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 1084-87, 1090; see also
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 55, § 10:12, at 677-79, 728-31 (stating that the
modern approach is to impose on landlords a duty to mitigate their damages
from their tenant's abandonment, and thereby promote the beneficial use of
the premises); SINGER, supra note 34, at 470-71 (noting that the modern rule
requires "reasonable" efforts to mitigate damages). The Uniform Residential
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quirement is also superfluous in the case of conditional transfer
clauses. Either way, efficiency considerations do not justify the
different treatment. Moreover, the stricter legal treatment of
the more moderate form of control-conditional alienation-
may motivate landlords to adopt the more extreme measure at
the outset, which would result in reduced property rights for
tenants.
2. Use Versus Nonuse
Although the right not to use one's property is assumed to
be a natural corollary of the more burdensome right to use
property,64 the law abounds with instances recognizing only the
latter. In these situations, owners cannot choose the more mod-
erate measure with respect to their property, but must exercise
the more extreme one which results in less freedom to others.
Nonuse of the property right may lead to its loss. Sometimes,
mere nonuse is sufficient to cause the loss of the right, while in
other cases an additional factor is necessary to effectuate this
result. I label the first type of cases "naked nonuse" and the
second "nonuse plus." The two categories are examined below
in the contexts of trademarks, rent-controlled housing, water
rights, servitudes, and ownership in land.
a. Trademarks
A trademark is a word, phrase, device or symbol that iden-
tifies the source of goods and services, and conveys information
about their attributes and qualities.6 5 The existence of such in-
formation and the possibility of associating a particular trade-
mark with a particular producer or seller reduce consumers'
search costs. 66 A trademark grants a property right that prohi-
bits others from using it without the owner's permission. Con-
sequently, the owner of a mark has an incentive to improve the
Landlord and Tenant Act states that if the landlord does not make reasonable
efforts to mitigate the damages caused by the tenant's abandonment (by at-
tempting to rent the apartment at a fair rental price), the lease is terminated
"as of the date the landlord has notice of abandonment." UNIF. RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 4.203(c) (amended 1974), 7B U.L.A. 400-01
(2006); see also Johnson, supra note 55, at 780-88 (explaining the efficiency of
a clause that completely prohibits the alienability of the lease).
64. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
65. 15 U.S.C.A § 1127 (West Supp. 2007); SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK
LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 1:1.1 (4th ed. 2006).
66. SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 169; Nicholas Economides, Trademarks, in
3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 601, 602-03
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY].
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product's quality and the reputation of its brand name, without
fearing that competitors will free-ride on her efforts or mislead
consumers.
67
In contrast to both copyrights and patents, trademarks
have no fixed expiration date. 68 A trademark, however, must be
used in order to be retained. 69 The Lanham Act requires that
an owner prove use of the trademark during the sixth year af-
ter registration and when applying for renewal every ten years,
by filing an affidavit to this effect. Failure to comply with this
requirement results in loss of the trademark. 70 The Act further
states that a trademark is deemed to be abandoned "[w]hen its
use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such
use."71 Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances;
nonuse of a trademark for three consecutive years is prima fa-
cie evidence of abandonment.7 2 An owner can rebut the infe-
rence of abandonment only by showing an actual intent to
resume use within a reasonable period of time.7 3 "Use" in this
context requires meaningful use of the mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not use that is made "merely to reserve a
right in a mark."74
67. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 2:3-2:4 (4th ed. 2007); SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 169-70;
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Pers-
pective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987).
68. The duration of copyrights and patents is limited. The former lasts for
the life of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). The latter
expires twenty years from the date of filing the patent application. 35 U.S.C.
§ 154(a)(2) (2000).
69. See, e.g., KANE, supra note 65, § 1:1.5[E] ('Use it or lose it' should be a
guiding principle for trademark owners."); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 67, § 16:9
(stating that ownership of a trademark requires continuous use). By contrast,
there is no general rule requiring the use of a copyrighted work or a patented
invention and nonuse does not extinguish the property right. SINGER, supra
note 34, at 818.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2000). The affidavit must contain both a state-
ment of use in commerce and specimens evidencing such use. Id. § 1058(b);
KANE, supra note 65, §§ 7:1-7:2. Use requirements are common in other coun-
tries as well. Richard J. Taylor, Loss of Trademark Rights Through Nonuse: A
Comparative Worldwide Analysis, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 197, 203-05 (1990).
71. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127(1) (West Supp. 2007).
72. Id.
73. Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 100-01 (5th Cir.
1983); Sodima v. Int'l Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 851 (D. Or. 1987).
74. 15 U.S.C.A § 1127(1). The "intent not to resume use" test for aban-
donment and the requirement of meaningful use in the ordinary course of
business apply not only to federally registered trademarks but to common law
marks as well. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30(2)(a) &
cmt. b (1995); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 67, § 17:11. Real commercial (rather
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The words "abandonment" and "intent" are somewhat mis-
leading in this context. Ordinarily, these words denote a sub-
jective and complete waiver of an entitlement by its owner. For
example, when we say that an owner "abandoned" her book, we
usually mean that she relinquished her possession of the book
with the subjective intention of forgoing her right of owner-
ship. 76 Consequently, the book becomes an ownerless object.7 6
In contrast, the Lanham Act inquires whether there is an in-
tent to resume use of the trademark, rather than an intent to
relinquish ownership.7 7 Moreover, the loss of the mark is not
conditioned upon an intention never to use it again. It suffices
that the owner cannot show an intention to resume use in the
foreseeable future.78 In other words, although the owner may
subjectively wish to retain the right in the mark and not aban-
don it-perhaps for the purpose of a future sale or for the even-
tuality that she might want to reuse it at a later date-she
cannot reserve the mark without at the same time using it.9
Nonuse is objectively viewed by the law as abandonment. The
trademark reverts to the public domain where it can be appro-
priated by others.80
This state of affairs is at odds with the notion that more is
better than less. From the point of view of those burdened by
the existence of the trademark, nonuse by the owner is better
than use. Nonuse benefits competitors in the market for similar
goods and services. The less the trademark is used, the greater
their freedom and the higher their chances of thriving and prof-
iting. Furthermore, nonuse of a trademark does not confuse or
than token) use of a trademark is required in other countries also. Taylor, su-
pra note 70, at 224-28.
75. See A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 73 (4th
ed. 2000).
76. Id.
77. Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 1989); Exxon,
695 F.2d at 102.
78. Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1989); PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 238-39 (5th ed. 2004).
79. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 67, § 17:5 (noting that trademark law applies
the term "abandonment" also to cases where the owner unintentionally loses
the mark); see also KANE, supra note 65, §§ 5:1.4, 12:2.3[B] (stating that aban-
donment cannot be avoided by token use or by "warehousing" a trademark).
80. Gen. Cigar Co. v. G.D.M. Inc., 988 F. Supp. 647, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 67, §§ 17:1-17:2.
652 [92:634
2008] EXPLORATION IN PROPERTY LAW
mislead consumers with respect to attributes or qualities of
goods and services.81
b. Rent-Controlled Housing
Leaseholds grant tenants the right to occupy and use the
premises for the duration of the lease.8 2 The right to use the
leased apartment ordinarily includes the right not to use it. Use
or occupation is permissible, not required.8 3 This state of affairs
follows naturally from the MBL argument. Continuous, inten-
sive use of the apartment unavoidably causes wear and tear.
The less the tenant uses the premises, the smaller this adverse
effect. Assuming the tenant pays the rent, the landlord will
usually not be harmed by nonexercise of the right, but will ra-
ther benefit from it.84
The rule allowing nonuse by tenants does not apply, how-
ever, to rent-controlled housing. Rent-control legislation aims
to protect low-income tenants against displacement by regulat-
81. In fact, scholars have argued that the abandonment doctrine may
harm consumers. This is because loss of the trademark enables others to use
it. If consumers still associate the trademark with the qualities of its former
owner's product, they may mistakenly believe that these qualities exist in the
competitor's product. Michael S. Denniston, Residual Good Will in Unused
Marks-The Case Against Abandonment, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 615, 646-49
(2000); Johanna F. Sistek, Goodwill Hunting: The Role of Residual Goodwill in
the Analysis of Trademark Abandonment, 22 ENT. & SPORTS L. 8, 9, 11 (2004).
This problem diminishes with the length of nonuse. If a long time has passed,
the public will no longer associate the mark with the product of its former
owner. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 78, at 240.
82. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§§ 6.11, 6.22 (3d ed. 2000).
83. 3 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 1518; SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 55,
§ 5:1, at 227; SINGER, supra note 34, at 460.
84. Even the exceptions to the above rule accord with the MBL argument,
as the exceptions recognize a duty to use the premises only when the landlord
is clearly harmed by nonuse. Such is the case, for instance, if the rent is based
on a percentage of the tenant's profits from using the premises for a certain
business. Courts have sometimes interpreted the contract to include an im-
plied covenant to use the premises in good faith for the relevant trade. Usual-
ly, a duty will be imposed only if the contract does not contain a base rent, or if
the fixed minimum rent is inadequate. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 55, § 5:3, at
230-33; SINGER, supra note 34, at 461-62. Likewise, if the premises are part of
a shopping center, the very fact of inactivity may have a detrimental effect on
the rest of the property, and so a covenant to operate commercially may be
implied. 3 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 1519. These exceptions are irrelevant
to residential leases. Since, from the landlord's point of view, nonuse in these
exceptional circumstances is actually worse than use, it is not surprising that
the tenant is not free to opt for nonuse.
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ing rent levels and restraining landlords' powers of eviction.8 5
Accordingly, after the expiration of the lease the tenant has a
right to remain in the apartment as a statutory tenant, and has
to pay only a prescribed, regulated rent.8 6 The landlord can
terminate the tenancy solely on specific grounds laid down in
the law.8 7 The tenant, however, must reside in the apartment,
or else forfeit her right.88 Primary residence elsewhere consti-
tutes grounds for eviction.8 9 This occupation requirement can-
not be bypassed by subletting the whole of the premises. 90 Al-
though family members of the tenant may have succession
rights to the apartment if the original tenant dies or vacates
the apartment, these too depend on the fulfillment of certain
occupancy requirements. 9 1 Thus, a rent-controlled tenant can-
85. For general discussion of the evolution of rent control in the United
States, see JOEL F. BRENNER & HERBERT M. FRANKLIN, RENT CONTROL IN
NORTH AMERICA AND FOUR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 46-54, 56-60 (1977).
86. T. M. ALDRIDGE, RENT CONTROL AND LEASEHOLD ENFRANCHISEMENT
34 (6th ed. 1975); 1 ROBERT F. DOLAN, RASCH'S LANDLORD AND TENANT § 2:39,
at 144-45 (4th ed. 1998); SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 55, §§ 7:1, 7:8; STOEBUCK
& WHITMAN, supra note 82, § 6.55; Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines for Drafting
Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 725-29,
732-37, 745-49, 765-76 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the
Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 742-45 (1988); Edward
H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 554-55 (1984).
87. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 55, § 7:10; Baar, supra note 86, at 833-35;
Susan E. Kaiser et al., Recent Developments in Urban Redevelopment, 21 URB.
L. ANN. 317, 347-48 (1981). See generally W. DENNIS KEATING ET AL., RENT
CONTROL: REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET (1998) (analyzing
different aspects of rent control, including its history, economics and politics,
as well as empirical studies of rent control in various cities).
88. DOLAN, supra note 86, § 2:39, at 145, § 8:13, at 333; P. F. SMITH,
EVANS & SMITH: THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 271, 275 (4th ed. 1993).
89. ALDRIDGE, supra note 86, at 35; ANDREW SCHERER, RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT LAW IN NEW YORK §§ 4:28, 4:45, 8:203, 8:207 (2005).
90. Conti v. Citrin, 505 N.Y.S.2d 481, 485-88 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that
an "illusory tenant," i.e., a lessee who does not occupy the premises as his pri-
mary residence but subleases it for a profit, cannot enjoy the protection of rent
control law); Skinner v. Geary, [1931] 2 K.B. 546, 559 (holding that the pur-
pose of the rent restriction law is "to protect a resident in a dwelling-house,
not to protect a person who is not a resident in a dwelling-house, but is mak-
ing money by sub-letting it"); SMITH, supra note 88, at 271, 275 (stating that
such subletting causes the loss of the right, since the tenant cannot comply
with the residency requirement).
91. DOLAN, supra note 86, § 2:39, at 145-46; SMITH, supra note 88, at
272-73. Thus, for instance, a family member seeking to succeed the original
tenant may have to prove that she used the apartment as her primary resi-
dence for a minimum period of two years prior to the original tenant's death.
DOLAN, supra note 86, § 10:13, at 459-60; SCHERER, supra note 89, §§ 4:203,
4:215-4:216.
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not refrain from using the premises while retaining the right to
resume occupation at will at some point in the future. 92
c. Water Rights
Like the laws of trademarks and rent control, the rules go-
verning water rights often apply the "use it or lose it" principle.
Most relevant for our inquiry are the western states, which
have adopted a "prior appropriation" system with respect to
water. 93 According to this system, the first person to use the
water beneficially (who need not necessarily be a riparian land-
owner), acquires a property right in the water. 94 This translates
into a right to divert a specified quantity of the flow of the wa-
ter source, in priority to others.95
A property right received through prior appropriation may
be lost, however, if not used. 96 The law in Kansas, for example,
provides that nonuse of the right without due and sufficient
cause results in its forfeiture. 97 There is no requirement that
92. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 958-59 (1985) (discussing use requirements in
subsidized housing programs).
93. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 1:1 (1988
& Supp. 2007). The alternative legal system adopted in the eastern states, of-
ten called "riparian rights," allows landowners whose property is on the banks
of flowing waters only "reasonable use" of the water in common with others,
and does not permit them to reduce the water to individual ownership. Each
landowner's use must not unreasonably interfere with the other riparian own-
ers' opportunity for reasonable use. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 82,
§ 7.4, at 421-23; 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 37, § 50.08(k);
Carol M. Rose, Riparian Rights, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra note
66, at 344-45. Since the riparian rights system does not grant exclusive prop-
erty rights in water, one cannot examine how nonuse would affect such rights.
94. TARLOCK, supra note 93, §§ 5:24-5:26; John C. Peck, Loss of Kansas
Water Rights for Non-Use, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 801, 805 (1995); Rose, supra
note 93, at 345; V. Lane Jacobson, Note, Snake River Basin Adjudication Issue
10: Partial Forfeiture for Non-Use of a Water Right in Idaho, 35 IDAHO L. REV.
179, 182-83 (1998).
95. TARLOCK, supra note 93, §§ 5:3-5:4, 5:14-5:15, 5:30; George A. Gould,
Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1,
5, 8-11 (1988). Appropriation systems are controlled by state agencies which
issue water permits and certificates of rights, adjudicate disputes, and enforce
the rules. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 82, § 7.4, at 425; TARLOCK, su-
pra note 93, §§ 5:32, 5:44, 5:47; Peck, supra note 94, at 806-07.
96. TARLOCK, supra note 93, § 5:86; 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, su-
pra note 37, § 50.09(gg).
97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 42-308 (2006); Peck, supra note 94, at 802. For in-
stance, the existence of adequate natural precipitation in certain years for
crops that usually require irrigation because of their location can constitute
due and sufficient cause for nonuse. Id. at 808-09; see also TARLOCK, supra
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the property owner intended to relinquish her right; it suffices
that she failed to exercise it.98 Likewise, under Idaho law a wa-
ter right not used for a period of five years is forfeited, regard-
less of the owner's intent. The right reverts to the state and
may be again subject to appropriation.99 Furthermore, prior
appropriation states also recognize a rule of partial forfeiture.
Under this principle, if an owner uses only a portion of her ap-
propriated water right, she may lose her right to the unused
portion. 100
note 93, § 5:89 (discussing various defenses to forfeiture and abandonment
claims).
98. Peck, supra note 94, at 823-25.
99. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-222(2) (2006); Jacobson, supra note 94, at 185.
For discussion of similar forfeiture rules in other states, see TARLOCK, supra
note 93, § 5:88; 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 37, § 50.09(gg);
and R. Lambeth Townsend, Cancellation of Water Rights in Texas: Use It or
Lose It, 17 ST. MARY'S L. J. 1217 (1986).
100. Peck, supra note 94, at 831-32; Townsend, supra note 99, at 1232-34;
Jacobson, supra note 94, at 187-92, 203-04. Note that some Western states
have recognized rights in instream flows, which entitle their holders to refrain
from diversion and consumption of water, in order to protect endangered fish,
wildlife and habitats, or for recreational purposes. Instream rights thus allow
nonuse of water to achieve certain goals. Mary Ann King, Getting Our Feet
Wet: An Introduction to Water Trusts, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 495, 503-06
(2004); Barton H. Thompson Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POLY REV. 261, 270-72 (2000). Typically, however, instream rights are
held by a state agency and not by individuals or private entities. Thus, even
when the initial acquisition of instream rights by the latter is permitted, they
are usually not allowed to hold on to the rights (for fear of future speculation),
but must transfer them to the state. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.332
(West 2003) (defining "In-stream water right" as requiring that the right be
held in trust by the Water Resources Department of Oregon); see also King,
supra, at 505-06; Thompson, supra, at 287, 289; Sarah B. Van de Wetering &
Robert W. Adler, New Directions in Western Water Law: Conflict or Collabora-
tion?, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15, 31 (2000). Furthermore, in order
to acquire an instream right at the outset, one must specifically apply for it
and prove that an environmental concern exists (for instance, by submitting
relevant scientific data). See, e.g., Application Form of the Alaska Department
of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.state.ak.us/mlw/water/instream (last
visited Dec. 1, 2007); see also Jack Sterne, Instream Rights and Invisible
Hands: Prospects for Private Instream Water Rights in the Northwest, 27
ENVTL. L. 203, 227-30 (1997) (discussing the rigorous testing and measure-
ment requirements for demonstrating a need for water reservation in Arizona
and Alaska). Thus, mere nonuse of water cannot establish an instream right
or constitute a defense against a use-it-or-lose-it rule. For further discussion of
instream rights, see infra note 231.
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d. Servitudes
Servitudes are nonpossessory property rights in land,101
providing their holders with a variety of possible enjoyments,
such as a right of way through another person's land, 102 a right
to sever and remove minerals, 103 a right to prevent construction
that would block a pleasing view, 104 or a right to restrict busi-
ness competition on a specified parcel.1 05 As property rights,
servitudes bind not only the original servient landowners, but
their successors in title as well.10 6 Servitudes may be of unli-
mited duration.1 0 7
In contrast to trademarks, rent-controlled housing, and
water rights, naked nonuse does not ordinarily terminate servi-
tudes.10 8 Servitudes usually belong to the category which I have
labeled "nonuse plus," whose extinction requires some addi-
tional factor besides nonexercise of the right. Thus, termination
may occur if nonuse is accompanied by some affirmative beha-
vior that expresses the servitude owner's intent to abandon her
right. 109 Many states, however, recognize an exception to the
101. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND
LICENSES IN LAND § 1:1 (2001 & Supp. 2007); 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.01[1] (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2000).
102. Hyland v. Fonda, 129 A.2d 899, 900-01 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1957).
103. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 82, § 8.1.
104. Id. (describing negative easements of "light, air, and view").
105. Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243, 248-50 (Mass.
1979); Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz & Sons, 579 A.2d 288, 295 (N.J. 1990).
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1) (2000).
107. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 101, § 10:1; POWELL, supra note 101,
§ 34.19.
108. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 101, §§ 10:18-10:19; Jennifer L. Romeo, An-
notation, Loss of Private Easement by Nonuse, 62 A.L.R. 5TH 219, § 3, at 266-
68 (1998).
109. Tract Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Kepler, 246 Cal. Rptr. 469, 476 (Ct. App.
1988); BRUCE & ELY, supra note 101, §§ 10:18, 10:20; 7 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 37, § 60.08(b)(3)(i)-(iii). Such is the case, for instance, if
the servitude holder not only ceased to use her right of way, but also blocked
the sole access route permitting exercise of the servitude by nailing a board
across garage doors and allowing a tree to grow near it. Hatcher v. Chesner,
221 A.2d 305, 307-08 (Pa. 1966). By contrast, nonexercise of the servitude
coupled with use of some alternative does not lead to termination. For exam-
ple, some courts have held that nonuse of a right of way while using an alter-
native route does not justify termination of the servitude. See, e.g., Jackvony v.
Poncelet, 584 A.2d 1112, 1117 (R.I. 1991); Filby v. Brooks, 481 N.Y.S.2d 865,
868 (App. Div. 1984). In addition, it has been held that termination may occur
if nonuse is accompanied by physical obstruction by the servient landowner for
the period required by the statute of limitations. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.7 & illus. 1 (2000) (involving the construction of a fence
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nonuse plus rule in the case of easements created by prescrip-
tion,110 holding that this type of servitude can be terminated by
nonuse that lasts for the period of prescription.1 1 1 Furthermore,
some states infer a rebuttable presumption of intent to aban-
don a servitude in case of lengthy nonuse by the owner.112
The Restatement (Third) of Property supports the general
nonuse plus rule that "[s]ome additional action on the part of
the beneficiary inconsistent with continued existence of the
servitude is normally required."113 However, it also states that
the amount of additional evidence required diminishes as the
period of nonuse grows longer, to the point where a very long
period of nonuse may suffice in itself to bring about the loss of
the right.11 4 Naked nonuse is recognized as grounds for termi-
nating servitudes in Louisiana,115 as well as in other legal sys-
tems.1 1 6
by the servient landowner that completely blocked the entrance to an ease-
ment of passage, and that stood for the duration of the prescriptive period);
POWELL, supra note 101, § 34.21[1]; STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 82,
§ 8.12, at 468-69.
110. For general discussion of the requirements for creating prescriptive
servitudes, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 2.16-2.17
(2000); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 82, § 8.7; and Will Saxe, When
"Comprehensive" Prescriptive Easements Overlap Adverse Possession: Shifting
Theories of "Use" and "Possession," 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 175, 185-92
(2006).
111. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 101, § 10:19; Romeo, supra note 108, at 270-
71; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 811(3)-(4) (West 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 47-
05-12(4) (2006).
112. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 101, § 10:19; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-
6 (2006).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.4 cmt. c (2000). Note
that the doctrine of "changed conditions" is applied when, as a result of some
change in the servient land or the surrounding area, it is impossible to use the
servitude or to accomplish its intended purpose. Id. § 7.10. A good example is a
servitude restricting the use of lots in a subdivision to residential purposes on-
ly, after many adjoining parcels have been commercially developed and have
changed the character of the neighborhood. See Owens v. Camfield, 614
S.W.2d 698, 700 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); Uvanni v. CMB Builders, Inc., 343
N.Y.S.2d 954, 955-56 (App. Div. 1973). Thus, under this doctrine, nonuse
alone by the servitude owner will not be considered a "change" that justifies
the termination of the servitude. See Scott v. Long Valley Farm Ky., Inc., 804
S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that nonuse of a water supply
easement and the existence of alternative means of attaining water do not jus-
tify termination).
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.4 cmt. c (2000).
115. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 753 (2006) ("[A] predial servitude is extin-
guished by nonuse for ten years."). Extinguishment by nonuse "applies to all
conventional servitudes, apparent or nonapparent, affirmative or negative."
A.N. Yiannopoulos, Extinction of Predial Servitudes, 56 TuL. L. REV. 1285,
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To sum up, the rules of servitude termination conflict, to
some extent, with the notion that more is better than less. Ser-
vitude holders are not totally at liberty to refrain from exercis-
ing their property right, even though nonuse is clearly less
burdensome to the servient landowner than use.
e. Ownership in Land
Unlike the previous examples, ownership of land is gener-
ally not forfeited by mere nonuse or by the affirmative behavior
of the property owner alone. 117 The main doctrine pursuant to
which ownership of land may be lost is adverse possession. As
indicated by its name, it requires wrongful occupation by
another person; nonuse by the landowner does not suffice. The
trespasser gains title to the land if her possession is adverse to
the owner's interests, 118 actual, open and notorious, exclusive,
and continuous for the statutory period of limitation. 1 9
The justification for the nonuse plus rule with respect to
land ownership will be discussed below. 20 At this point, let it
suffice to note that even in this context, the freedom not to use
is somewhat curtailed. Although failure to occupy and use land
does not in itself result in forfeiture of ownership,' 2' neglect
1291 (1982). The running of the ten-year prescription period commences for
affirmative servitudes from the date of their last use. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
754 (2006). If the servitude has never been used, the relevant starting time is
the date the servitude was established and its exercise became possible. Yian-
nopoulos, supra, at 1293.
116. For example, servitudes are terminated in France after thirty years of
nonuse, and in Greece after twenty years. Yiannopoulos, supra note 115, at
1291. Under Israeli law, courts have general discretion to terminate a servi-
tude on grounds of nonuse alone, without laying down any fixed minimal pe-
riod of nonuse. See § 96 of the Land Law, 5729-1969, 23 LSI 283, 299-300
(1966-69) (Isr.).
117. Furthermore, and in contrast to other kinds of property, land cannot
be "abandoned" by its owner and thereby rendered ownerless. STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 82, at 468.
118. That is to say, her possession does not stem from the owner's right
and is without the owner's permission. Id. at 856.
119. For general discussion of the various requirements of adverse posses-
sion, see 16 POWELL, supra note 101, §§ 91.03-91.08, and Jeffrey E. Stake, The
Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2423-32 (2001). The
statutory period of limitation varies from state to state and ranges from five to
forty years. POWELL, supra, § 91.10[1]; 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, su-
pra note 37, § 87.01, at 77-86.
120. See infra notes 232-35, 252-53 and accompanying text.
121. Interestingly, this was not always the case. In the colonial era, land
use statutes often required owners to continuously use and develop their land.
Failure to comply with these requirements resulted in forfeiture of title to the
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and nonuse create the risk that a trespasser will take posses-
sion and eventually gain title. This (relative) lack of freedom
not to use land becomes apparent once we compare the Ameri-
can system to legal systems that do not recognize adverse pos-
session claims in land.122 In the latter, a trespasser cannot gain
title or immunity from an ejection suit, regardless of the length
of time she wrongfully possesses the land. Clearly, there is
greater freedom not to use land under such a system.
Arguably, the existence of an adverse possession doctrine
does not force owners to use their land. As long as they check
the land once in a while for the presence of trespassers, and file
suits within the limitation period, they may both retain title
and not use their property. 123 In practice, however, nonusing
owners are often absent or far from their property. It may
therefore be quite costly to monitor the land and periodically
sue wrongdoers. As a result, an adverse possession doctrine can
be seen as a limitation on the freedom not to use one's land.124
In conclusion, although land ownership is governed by a
nonuse plus regime, rather than by a naked nonuse regime, the
MBL argument does not apply even here without reserve. Al-
though other people would (ordinarily) be less adversely af-
fected by nonuse of land than by its use, 25 the former liberty is
somewhat curtailed.
land, even if no one else gained possession of it. The state could then give the
land to others. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for
Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259-63 (1996).
122. Israeli Law, for instance, does not recognize adverse possession claims
with respect to "settled" lands. See § 159(b) of the Land Law, 5729-1969, 23
LSI 283, 311 (1966-69) (Isr.). Ninety-six percent of the lands in Israel have
undergone a settlement of title procedure, according to the Land (Settlement
of Title) Ordinance (New Version), 5729-1969, 2 LSI 41 (1972) (Isr.), and are
thus considered "settled" land.
123. Merrill, supra note 16, at 1130.
124. Although statutes of limitations apply, in principle, to all assets, the
above argument is particularly relevant to land. When a person gains wrong-
ful possession of personal property-for example, by theft of a valuable paint-
ing-it is artificial to speak of the owner's choice between use and nonuse of
her property. If the asset in question is an intangible right, such as a copy-
right, one cannot speak of possession at all. The period of limitation will run
against a copyright owner that does not enforce her right against copying by
others, even if she continuously uses the copyright herself.
125. The law of nuisance, for instance, will not protect the neighbors of a
landowner from all harms resulting from the use of her land. There is a thre-
shold of damage that individuals must bear, and the neighbors will have to
prove that the harmful activity constitutes a substantial and unreasonable in-
terference with the use and enjoyment of their land. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
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3. Destruction Versus Modification, Alienation, or Neglect
Arguably, the most extreme measure that an owner can
take with respect to her property is to destroy it. The bundle of
rights constituting ownership of an asset includes the right of
destruction. 126 True, as is the case with other rights, the right
to destroy is not absolute. Various laws prohibit the destruction
of specific assets, such as buildings designated for conserva-
tion,127 certain types of currency,1 28 or trees protected under a
preservation order. 129 Nevertheless, the law does not as a rule
prevent owners from destroying their property, and there is no
general prohibition on destroying valuable assets. 130
In the present context, we are interested in cases in which
total destruction is allowed, while more moderate measures
such as modification or alienation are less tolerated. Once
again, this phenomenon conflicts with the MBL argument. De-
struction can be viewed as the most extreme form of use of an
asset by its owner. 131 If the owner can use up the property com-
pletely, then, according to this argument, she should also be
able to affect it less drastically, in a manner that leaves some of
the property intact. Moreover, scholars have argued that the
right to destroy-as an extreme form of waste-should be more
restricted than other rights in the property owner's bundle. 132
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 88, at 626, 629 (W. Page Kee-
ton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
126. The right to destroy (ius abutendi) is commonly listed among the
rights of ownership. Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic
Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 997 (1939).
127. F.H. LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 116 (2d ed.
1982); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The "Conservation Game . The Possibility of
Voluntary Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural Importance, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 733, 738-39 (1997).
128. Lior J. Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 843
(2005).
129. LAWSON & RUDDEN, supra note 127, at 116.
130. Id. (noting that the owner of a Vermeer painting can destroy it); Ho-
nor6, supra note 23, at 118 (stating that a general requirement not to destroy
would be "inconsistent with the liberal idea of ownership").
131. Strahilevitz, supra note 128, at 794 (asserting that the right to destroy
is an extreme exercise of an owner's rights to use the property, to exclude oth-
ers from using it, and to control its subsequent alienation).
132. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76, 77, 81,
91-96 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (arguing against the right to destroy); see
also JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 42, 200-01 (1999) (asserting that owners
should not have the right to destroy cultural property-such as works of art
and literary works-unless they are their creators).
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a. Moral Rights
The rules relating to authors' moral rights provide one illu-
stration of the rejection of the MBL reasoning. Generally
speaking, authors are entitled to have their work attributed to
them, and they have the right to prevent modifications of the
work that are prejudicial to their honor or reputation. 13 3 For
example, the owner of a painting or a sculpture cannot alter it
in a way that is detrimental to the artist's honor or reputation.
Moral rights are given to authors regardless of whether they
have the copyright in their work. 134 It is also immaterial
whether they are the owners of the tangible object in which
their creation is embodied.135
While all legal systems that recognize moral rights protect
against injurious changes in the narrow sense-those that do
not eliminate the embodiment of the work completely-there is
no unanimity as to whether the right to prevent modifications
extends to total destruction. 136 International and most national
133. The primary international source of moral rights is Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention). Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works art. 6bis, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 36. Moral rights are widely rec-
ognized in continental Europe and apply in principle to all types of copyright-
able works. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 353, 359-61 (2006) (noting that moral rights in France, Germany,
and Italy generally protect authors of copyrightable works, and are thus inte-
grated into the copyright statutes). United States legislation has adopted a
narrower framework of moral rights that protects only works of visual art. See
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000); see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005) (defining
"work of visual art"); Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990:
American Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 373, 409-10 (1995). This
narrow definition excludes, for instance, literary and architectural works.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b); 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE
CONVENTION AND BEYOND 599 (2d ed. 2006).
135. The duration of moral rights varies from country to country. In Eng-
land and Germany, for example, the time limit of moral rights is identical to
that of the economic copyright: both expire seventy years after the death of the
author. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 12(2), 86(1)
(Eng.), reprinted in 11 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES, 956,
1051 (4th ed. 2006 reissue); Adolf Deitz, Germany, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 7[3] (Paul E. Geller ed., 2006). Moral rights
in the United States are limited to the life of the author and hence expire be-
fore the copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). In contrast, France and Italy rec-
ognize perpetual moral rights that extend beyond the life of the copyright.
John H. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
1023, 1041-42 (1976); Rigamonti, supra note 133, at 361 n.51.
136. WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 461-62 (5th ed.
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legislation (with the notable exception of the United States) 137
does not refer specifically to the case of destruction, 138 and
courts and commentators are reluctant to extend moral rights
to encompass a right not to have one's work destroyed.139 More-
over, even the American exception does not equate destruction
with alteration: whereas the statute protects every work (with-
in the statute's definition of "visual art") from detrimental mod-
ification, it only protects works of "recognized stature" from de-
struction. 140  The need to prove established quality and
importance reduces the practical significance of this legislative
expansion. 141 We may thus conclude that moral rights allow
2003); 1 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 134, at 605.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
138. 1 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 134, at 605 (asserting that it is
clear that destruction remained outside the scope of Article 6bi s of the Berne
Convention); Christopher J. Robinson, The "Recognized Stature" Standard in
the Visual Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1940 (2000) ("[T]here
is no express provision in the Berne Convention against the complete destruc-
tion of a work of art.").
139. JEREMY PHILLIPS & ALISON FIRTH, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 266 (4th ed. 2001) (asserting that moral rights in England do
not protect from total destruction); DAVID VAVER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENTS, TRADE-MARKS 90-91 (1997) (citing Canadian cas-
es that held that total destruction does not violate moral rights); Adolf Dietz,
The Artist's Right of Integrity Under Copyright Law-A Comparative Ap-
proach, 25 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 177, 190-91 (1994) (ex-
plaining that German law does not extend the right to prevent detrimental
modifications to complete destruction of works); Judica Krikke, Copyright: No
Moral Rights Protection Against Destruction, 26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
N-155, N-155 to -56 (2004) (reporting on a Supreme Court of the Netherlands
decision that held that the Berne Convention was not meant to include the de-
struction of works, and that total destruction cannot be considered to be "muti-
lation" under the Dutch Copyright Act); Rigamonti, supra note 133, at 371
(stating that the right to prevent destruction is "usually not protected in Con-
tinental Europe"); Robinson, supra note 138, at 1937 (noting that the Ameri-
can provision regarding destruction grants a moral right beyond that common-
ly accepted in Europe).
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B); Sherman, supra note 133, at 411.
141. See, e.g., Pollara v. Seymour, 206 F. Supp. 2d 333, 336-37 (N.D.N.Y.
2002) (dismissing a claim by an artist under 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) for fail-
ure to prove that a mural intended for display at a one-time event qualified as
a work of "recognized stature"). To meet the "recognized stature" threshold, it
must be proven that the work in question is both meritorious and recognized
as such by experts (such as other artists, art dealers, or museum curators).
Francesca Garson, Before That Artist Came Along, It Was Just a Bridge: The
Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork, 11
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203, 227-28 (2001); Robinson, supra note 138, at
1945, 1950-51. Furthermore, it has been argued that the "recognized stature"
limitation renders the right against destruction empty, since the owner of such
works would rarely have an incentive to destroy them. Henry Hansmann &
2008]
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property owners more freedom to totally destroy their assets-
in which authors' works are embodied-than to modify their
property.
b. Cultural Property
Outside the sphere of moral rights, the laws protecting cul-
tural property provide another demonstration of the greater in-
tervention with relatively moderate measures. Generally
speaking, the law does not prevent private owners of cultural
property from destroying it;142 "you can throw darts at your
Rembrandt." 143 In contrast, more moderate decisions do not re-
ceive similar respect. For example, laws often curtail the own-
er's rights of alienation and use by heavily restricting the ex-
port of cultural property or by granting the right of first refusal
to domestic purchasers. 144
Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and
Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 111 (1997). Thus, there may be little
practical difference between the American rule and the civil-law rule, which
"provides no protection at all against complete destruction of a work of art."
Id. Notably, the right against destruction is further qualified in § 113(d) of the
American Copyright Act, which deals with works of art installed or incorpo-
rated into buildings. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (2000). Accordingly, property owners
have considerable freedom to destroy a work of art (such as a mural) that can-
not be otherwise removed from the premises. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(3),
113(d)(1); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8D.06[C][3] (2007); Sherman, supra note 133, at 418-22.
142. I refer here to cultural property that is not subject to the moral rights
discussed above (for example, a painting by an artist whose moral rights have
expired), and is not owned by the state. The law may provide that certain cat-
egories of cultural property, such as archaeological objects unearthed by pri-
vate individuals, are property of the state. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT
E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 89, 95-96 (4th ed. 2002);
LYNDEL V. PROTT & P. J. O'KEEFE, 1 LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE:
DISCOVERY AND EXCAVATION 188-91 (1984); SAX, supra note 132, at 184-85;
Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed
Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 391-92 (1995). Since private owner-
ship is excluded in these cases, one cannot compare the legal treatment of ex-
treme and moderate measures by private owners with respect to their proper-
ty.
143. SAX, supra note 132, at 4; see also Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsi-
bilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property: Toward a National Art Preser-
vation Statute, 24 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 177, 187-88 (2001) (stating that moral
rights in the United States expire upon the death of the artist and that there-
fore "art can be lawfully destroyed ... after an artist's death").
144. KIFLE JOTE, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
HERITAGE 158-61, 165 (1994) (discussing export restrictions and preemption
rights for domestic buyers in Canada, and concluding that most national cul-
tural property laws address illicit traffic and export); MERRYMAN & ELSEN,
supra note 142, at 89, 96-102 (listing various limitations on the sale of cultur-
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c. Animals
Animal protection laws provide yet another example of the
lesser extent of intervention by the state in the face of more ex-
treme measures. Most states consider animals to be the proper-
ty of their owners, who are generally free to "destroy" them as
long as the animal is put down in a way that does not inflict
pain.145 In contrast, an owner is not allowed to neglect or mis-
treat her animal, for instance by starving or torturing it.146
al property and focusing on export restrictions and preemptive rights under
Italian law); PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 142, at 197 (listing countries that
impose a right of preemption on sales); Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the Inter-
national Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 313-17 (1982) (stating that al-
most all countries regulate the export of cultural property; describing restric-
tions such as total embargo, screening through licensing and permit systems,
and the state's preemptive right to purchase cultural property for itself or on
behalf of national museums); Borodkin, supra note 142, at 391-92 (noting that
most countries restrict export of antiquities through various prohibitions and
licensing requirements).
145. GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 24, 44, 128-
29, 133 (1995) (asserting that animals are regarded as property and hence
may be killed by their owners, and that protective legislation has never been
interpreted to interfere with unnecessary killing by owners if done in a hu-
mane fashion). The Federal Animal Welfare Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544,
80 Stat. 350 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2131-2159 (West 2007)),
does not expressly prohibit the extermination of animals, but rather bans cer-
tain forms of abuse and neglect. Although state legislation sometimes adds
"killing" to the prohibition on torture and mistreatment, it also typically
carves out broad exceptions for the killing of animals by their owners. See M.
Varn Chandola, Dissecting American Animal Protection Law: Healing the
Wounds with Animal Rights and Eastern Enlightenment, 8 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 3,
9-10 (2002) (citing state legislation that creates exceptions for the killing of an
animal by its owner, without requiring justification).
146. FRANCIONE, supra note 145, at 121 (stating that anticruelty statutes
focus on humane treatment of animals by prohibiting, for instance, depriva-
tion of necessary food, water, or sanitary living conditions); Darian M. Ibra-
him, The Anticruelty Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare, 1 J. ANIMAL L. &
ETHICS 175, 179-80 (2006) (asserting that protective legislation prohibits only
the infliction of unjustified pain and suffering); see, e.g., State v. Hill, 996
S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that while Missouri law does not
preclude owners from intentionally killing their animals in a humane way, it
prohibits them from intentionally and purposely causing them injury or suffer-
ing). Admittedly, mistreatment may cause an animal severe pain, whereas its
killing may be relatively painless. In such cases, shouldn't we regard killing as
the more moderate measure? Notwithstanding the fact that mistreatment may
inflict more pain, I believe that annihilation is still the more extreme measure.
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II. MORE IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER THAN LESS-
NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
Part I of this Article demonstrated that despite its strong
intuitive appeal, the "more is better than less" argument is re-
jected by numerous legal rules and doctrines in a wide variety
of contexts. Property owners have more freedom to refrain
from, or to prohibit the transfer of their property than to trans-
fer it conditionally; more liberty to use property than not to use
it; more power to destroy property than to modify, alienate or
neglect it. Thus, we have observed cases where total inaliena-
bility is respected, whereas restrictions on alienability are
struck down; intensive use is permitted, but nonuse extin-
guishes the right; destruction allowed, yet modification forbid-
den.
This Part of the Article moves from doctrine to theory, and
offers normative justifications for tolerating extreme measures
to a greater extent than moderate ones. Three types of justifica-
tions are offered for greater scrutiny and intervention in the
case of moderate-rather than extreme-measures with respect
to property rights: protecting property transferees; reducing the
incidence of low-valuing owners; and correcting distributive er-
rors. These explanations are supported by both normative
analysis and lessons from behavioral studies. 147
A. PROTECTING POTENTIAL PROPERTY TRANSFEREES
A major reason for intervening where property owners take
moderate measures is the protection of property transferees.
This justification for legal interference falls into two categories:
preventing significant harm to welfare, and avoiding confusion
and mistakes.
1. Preventing Severe Harm to Welfare
More property is not better than less when, contrary to
what one might initially expect, the outcome that apparently
produces "more property" for the transferees, in fact adversely
affects their long-term welfare. It may very well be the case
that a moderate measure (which grants more property to reci-
pients), generates more harm than an extreme measure (which
147. The justifications discussed below do not exhaust the reasons for re-
jecting the MBL argument. For an additional type of justification focusing on
minimum standard requirements for economic and social relationships, see
infra notes 180 & 311.
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results in their receiving less property). There are various rea-
sons for this seemingly paradoxical outcome.
Compare a conditional transfer of property with no trans-
fer at all. Conditions attached to the transfer of property might
insult or humiliate the transferee, thereby harming her dignity
and self-respect. 148 Moreover, an attempt by the transferee to
meet the stipulated conditions, even if successful, may gravely
injure her autonomy and her opportunity for self-development
and self-realization. 149 By contrast, when property is not trans-
ferred at all, these injuries will not occur: no insulting message
is conveyed along with the property, and the harmful conse-
quences from satisfying the offensive conditions do not trans-
pire. In this sense, more property can sometimes be regarded as
worse than less or even none.
Take, for instance, a will conditioning a bequest of property
on the beneficiary's termination of relations with her sibling,
choosing an opposite-sex spouse in conflict with her sexual
identity, adoption of a particular religious faith, or relinquish-
ment of her favored profession (deemed by the testator as un-
suitable for a woman). 150 Such conditions attempt to exert pow-
er and control over a person's most significant and intimate life
choices-the very decisions that every individual should make
for herself. 15 1 They express, by their very existence, disrespect
for the transferee as an autonomous individual. Fulfillment of
such conditions by recipients who were tempted by the prospect
of owning the property exacerbates the adverse effects on their
welfare. Current law seems to follow this reasoning. It strikes
down conditions similar to the ones mentioned above as violat-
ing public policy 152 while at the same time recognizing the right
148. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
149. See Sherman, supra note 37, at 1300 (stating that respect for individ-
ual autonomy should preclude the enforcement of certain testamentary condi-
tions).
150. Thus, for example, in the case of Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, a donor
conditioned a cash bequest to four of six siblings on their having no communi-
cation with the other two. 20 A.2d 21, 24-25 (N.J. Ch. 1941). In Drace v. Kli-
nedinst, a donor conditioned a bequest of land on the descendents' continued
adherence to a particular religious faith. 118 A. 907, 908 (Pa. 1922).
151. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 291-303 (1983) (arguing that ownership of property
and the economic power it wields in the market should not carry over to domi-
nion and control over people in the political sphere).
152. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
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of potential donors to refrain from transferring property at
all. 153
To better understand the impact of these rules, it is worth
examining two variables. One is the subjective perception of the
potential transferee as to whether receiving the property sub-
ject to conditions is worse than not receiving it at all. The other
is the potential donor's reaction to the law's invalidation of cer-
tain conditions. A donor may either forgo control and transfer
the property without conditions, 15 4 or refrain from bestowing
the property.
If the intended transferee would have been insulted by the
condition and viewed compliance with it as worse than not ob-
taining the property, then a legal rule that reflects this position
does not adversely affect either party. The donor would not in
any case have been able to achieve her first choice, which was
to transfer the property subject to the condition. If she decides,
as her second best choice and in response to the legal rule, not
to transfer the property at all, then this outcome is equivalent
to that of an attempted conditioned transfer in a world without
the legal rule, since the potential transferee will reject the
transfer. In contrast, if, given the rule, the donor prefers an un-
conditional transfer to nontransfer, then the transferee is bet-
ter off, whereas the donor is neither positively nor negatively
affected by the rule. 155 In both cases, the legal rule reduces
transaction costs by signaling that attempts to prescribe cer-
tain types of conditions are likely to be futile.
Scenarios in which transferees prefer to receive no proper-
ty rather than some property are perfectly realistic; researchers
have extensively tested and documented them in the behavioral
literature. One example is the experiment known as the Ulti-
matum Game.156 In the basic form of this game, one person (the
153. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
154. I refer here to objectionable conditions of the type discussed above be-
cause, obviously, the donor is free to include conditions that are not similarly
harmful.
155. It is reasonable to assume that although the beneficiary prefers no
transfer to conditioned transfer of the property, she also prefers unconditioned
transfer to no transfer at all.
156. For studies of the Ultimatum Game, see Werner Gith et al., An Expe-
rimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367
(1982); Alvin E. Roth et al., Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem,
Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
1068 (1991); and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J.
ECON. PERSP. 195 (1988). For a general survey of Ultimatum Game experi-
ments, see Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF
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proposer) is asked to divide a sum of money between herself
and another person (the responder). The responder is then free
to choose either to accept or to reject the amount offered. If she
accepts, then the sum is divided between the two parties as
agreed. If she declines, neither player receives anything. The
standard economic prediction is that responders would accept
any positive share of the pie, since any amount is preferable to
none. Knowing this, proposers will offer the smallest possible
denomination of currency (which responders will then accept),
thus retaining for themselves almost all of the original sum of
money. 157
Experimental results, however, have dramatically deviated
from this prediction. Most proposers offered substantial
amounts of money, which often reached an equal split of the
profits, and such offers were indeed accepted by responders.1 58
Offers that deviated substantially from fifty percent-such as
less than twenty percent-were usually rejected. 159 Research-
ers reached similar results in variants on the basic game when
relatively large sums of money were involved, 160 or when nu-
merous rounds were played (instead of one-shot games). 16 1 One
dominant motivation demonstrated by the Ultimatum Game is
that people wish to be treated fairly and will thus reject unfair
or insulting offers even if economically advantageous.1 62 This
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253, 258-92 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds.,
1995) [hereinafter Roth, Bargaining Experiments].
157. See Gary E. Bolton, A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and
Evidence, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1096, 1097 (1991); Roth, Bargaining Experi-
ments, supra note 156, at 257-58.
158. Colin F. Camerer, Progress in Behavioral Game Theory, 11 J. ECON.
PERSP. 167, 169 (1997).
159. Id.; see Gith et al., supra note 156, at 374-76; Ramzi Suleiman, Ex-
pectations and Fairness in a Modified Ultimatum Game, 17 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
531,532-33, 547 (1996).
160. In one variant, the sum to be divided was $100 (instead of the more
typical $10 pie). Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On Expectations and the Monetary
Stakes in Ultimatum Games, 25 INT'L J. GAME THEORY 289, 295-96, 299
(1996). In another experiment played in Indonesia, researchers recorded simi-
lar results when the amount to be shared was the equivalent of three months'
income. Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Expe-
rimental Evidence from Indonesia, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 47, 47, 58 (1999).
161. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 28-31 (1992); Roth, Bargaining Experiments,
supra note 156, at 259-67.
162. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and
Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80
TEX. L. REV. 219, 230 (2001); Roth, Bargaining Experiments, supra note 156,
at 264-65, 267. Another important motivation reflected in ultimatum bargain-
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preference for nothing over something has been found to exist
even in a variant of the game where the responder could de-
cline only her own payoff, knowing that her refusal will not af-
fect the proposer's share!163
Returning to the donor-transferee context, it is reasonable
to assume a direct correlation between the magnitude of the in-
sult to the intended transferee and the value of the property
consequently rejected. The greater the harm perceived by the
recipient, the more property she will be willing to turn down.
And lest we suppose that voluntary relinquishment of goods is
limited to trifles, recall the English king who rejected a crown
conditioned on not marrying the woman he loved, saying, "I
have found it impossible to carry the heavy burden of responsi-
bility and to discharge my duties as King, as I wish to do, with-
out the help and support of the woman I love."'164
Alternatively, one should consider the possibility that, ab-
sent the legal rule, the transferee would not have rejected the
conditioned property. In this scenario, the legal rule blocks a
transfer that would otherwise occur. This intervention can be
justified on the basis of an objective theory of welfare. An objec-
tive theory rejects the idea that people's well-being is solely de-
termined by the extent to which their subjective, actual prefe-
rences are fulfilled. 165 As actual preferences might be based on
mistake, prejudice, whims, or lack of self-respect, their satisfac-
tion might reduce, rather than enhance, welfare. 166 The objec-
ing is that people are willing to sacrifice some of their material well-being in
order to punish people who act unfairly. Gith et al., supra note 156, at 384;
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1493-95 (1998). Experimental studies have shown that both mo-
tivations determine people's behavior. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra, at 231.
163. Werner Guith & Steffen Huck, From Ultimatum Bargaining to Dicta-
torship-An Experimental Study of Four Games Varying in Veto Power, 48
METROECONOMICA 262, 272 (1997). This experiment demonstrates the exis-
tence of a fairness per se motivation.
164. EDWARD WINDSOR, A KING'S STORY: THE MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF
WINDSOR 355, 411 (1951).
165. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Ob-
jectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1701 (2003). Actual prefe-
rences are those which a person has in fact, whatever their content. JAMES
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND MORAL IMPORTANCE
10 (1986); John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour,
in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 55 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams
eds., 1982).
166. ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, FINITE AND INFINITE GOODS: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICS 84-85, 89-91 (1999); SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE
ETHICS 38 (1998); Richard J. Arneson, Human Flourishing Versus Desire Sa-
tisfaction, 16 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 113, 124 (1999).
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tive theory holds that certain things-such as autonomy, know-
ledge, successful achievement of worthwhile goals, realization
of one's potential, deep and meaningful social relationships and
enjoyment-are good for people and promote their welfare. 167
These things have intrinsic value that is independent of prefe-
rences or tastes.168 By the same token, some things detrimen-
tally affect people's welfare, even if the individuals concerned
do not realize it.169 An objective criterion judges individuals'
well-being by the extent to which they attain the goods worth
having in their lives and avoid the intrinsically bad. 170
Under an objective theory of welfare, if as a result of the
legal rule the donor decides to transfer the property uncondi-
tionally, then the transferee is better off, whereas the donor's
autonomy is injured, since she cannot realize her highest-
ranking preference, but only her second-best one. It stands to
reason, however, that the magnitude of the benefits to the reci-
pient of unrestricted property outweighs the loss to the donor.
One must remember that the legal rule does not intervene with
all-or even most-conditions, but only with those pertaining
to the most significant or intimate life choices of individuals.1 71
From an objective welfare perspective, a donor's interference in
these choices is particularly harmful to the long-term well-
being of the transferee. The donor's loss in terms of her auton-
167. GRIFFIN, supra note 165, at 67-68; KAGAN, supra note 166, at 39;
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 499 (1984); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra
note 165, at 1701-05.
168. STEPHEN DARWALL, WELFARE AND RATIONAL CARE 1, 3, 103 (2002);
see also T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 112-13 (1998).
169. KAGAN, supra note 166, at 39; PARFIT, supra note 167, at 499.
170. An objective theory of well-being need not entail unwarranted interfe-
rence with people's desires or liberty. One safeguard, for instance, is already
built into the objective theory itself. According to the theory, "autonomy" and
"enjoyment" are also objective goods. Because these goods are not the only
ones on the list, they consequently do not receive the same supremacy that
they would have had in an actual preferences theory of welfare. To illustrate,
sufficient increases in other goods-such as accomplishment or deep relation-
ships-may outweigh losses in autonomy. Nevertheless, autonomy and plea-
sure can and should be given substantial weight. GRIFFIN, supra note 165, at
71; Thomas Scanlon, Value, Desire and Quality of Life, in THE QUALITY OF
LIFE 185, 192 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). Thus, for in-
stance, the value of autonomy may prevent us from compelling people to adopt
a single best activity, but it would not preclude us from the much milder inter-
ference of forbidding a certain worst activity or preventing a result that would
greatly reduce well-being, while leaving numerous other options available for
free choice. THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 149, 152, 156 (1993); Lewinsohn-
Zamir, supra note 165, at 1706-07, 1710-13, 1718-19.
171. See supra notes 39-46, 150-53 and accompanying text.
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omy is substantially smaller for two reasons. First, a preference
to excessively exert control over another person's life conflicts
with other objective goods, such as attaining appropriate rela-
tionships of mutual respect. Second, were the goals underlying
the conditions extremely important to the donor, she would
have responded by not transferring the property at all. The fact
that she opted to make an unrestricted giving demonstrates
that this was not the case. We should not permit conditioned
transfers that severely injure the beneficiary's welfare while
only slightly enhancing the donor's well-being.
Finally, even if a subset of potential donors would prefer
absolute nontransfer to unconditioned transfer, the rule invali-
dating certain restrictions may still be justified. First, we
should judge any rule by its overall outcomes, taking into ac-
count all possible scenarios, rather than judging one case in iso-
lation. Second, since preferences are largely endogenous and
legal rules often have educational effects, 172 the very existence
of the rules may gradually decrease the number of donors fa-
voring nontransfer over unconditioned transfer. 173 Third, the
subjective loss to the donor from not being able to transfer
property subject to restrictions is mitigated by the fact that the
law does not coerce an unconditioned transfer. The legal rule
blocks only one of the property owner's options-a certain type
of restricted transfer-leaving many paths open for autonom-
ous choice. The law honors the donor's wish to withhold proper-
ty from a person that does not submit to her control. Fourth,
the injury to the potential transferee from not receiving the
property at all should be offset against the grave objective
harms that would have ensued (in the absence of the legal rule)
had she received the conditioned property. 174
172. Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 217, 221-42 (1993) (discussing the endogenouity of preferences
and its normative implications); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 111, 118, 128-29, 132-33 (2002) (advocating the use of
default rules to shape people's preferences and "push" their subjective valua-
tions in a welfare-enhancing direction).
173. The fact that wills, trusts, and gifts of significant value are ordinarily
executed with the assistance of lawyers ensures that the legal rule would be
widely known and communicated to the donors.
174. The former injury is further mitigated by the fact that the property
was never given-even conditionally-to its potential recipient. The latter may
even be unaware of the fact that, were it not for the legal rule, the donor would
have given her property subject to conditions. As behavioral studies clearly
demonstrate, a forgone gain "hurts" much less than a loss of a thing one al-
ready possesses. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
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The same conclusions may hold even if one adopts an ideal
preferences theory of welfare rather than an objective theory.
According to an ideal preferences theory, a person's well-being
is judged not by the preferences she actually has, but rather ac-
cording to the preferences she would have if she thoroughly,
clearly and calmly deliberated all possible alternatives and
their consequences on the basis of full information and without
any errors of reasoning. 175 In the present context, ideal prefe-
rences support the nullification of certain injurious conditions.
It can be claimed that preferences formed under ideal condi-
tions would lead a person to reject the conditioned property.
Furthermore, even if one adheres to strictly subjective criteria
of well-being-fulfillment of actual preferences or attainment of
pleasure and avoidance of pain176-an individual's well-being is
measured not according to her preferences or mental states at a
particular point in time, but rather by the degree to which her
preferences are satisfied, or her happiness is enhanced, over
the course of her life. 177 If we can foresee with high probability
that a person who is willing to accept a conditioned entitlement
will eventually regret her decision, or that it will cause her
more sorrow than happiness overall, then even these subjective
theories justify the invalidation of harmful conditions. At times,
the existence of second-order preferences (preferences people
have with regard to their own, first-order preferences) 178 can
also substantiate such invalidation. Individuals may succumb
to the temptation of accepting restricted property, yet at the
175. See GRIFFIN, supra note 165, at 11-13; KAGAN, supra note 166, at 38;
HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 110-12 (7th ed. 1981). Elsewhere
I have argued that any plausible theory of well-being, including a preferences-
satisfaction theory, contains strong objective components that bring it very
close to an objective theory of welfare. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 165, at
1690-1700.
176. Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian conception of welfare equates well-being
with happiness, defined as the presence of pleasure and absence of pain. Wel-
fare is calculated by subtracting the total quantity of pain from the total quan-
tity of pleasure. JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIANS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 407, 412 (Dolphin Books 1961)
(1823); see also JEREMY BENTHAM: THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 11-12 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1970)
(1789).
177. Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 246
n.49 (1998).
178. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Per-
son, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971) (formulating the distinction between first- and
second-order preferences).
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same time wish they had resisted it. 179 Legal intervention with
conditioned transfers may thus satisfy people's second-order
preferences, which are as real as their first-order ones.
In summary, a conditioned transfer of property might sig-
nificantly harm the transferee's long-term well-being in a way
that nontransfer of property cannot. This injury may lead the
intended transferee herself to reject the property altogether.
When this is not the case, various theories of welfare support a
rule that strikes down objectionable conditions, even if the
transferees would have chosen to accept the property and
comply with the conditions attached to it.180
Similar reasoning can explain why the extant rules govern-
ing moral rights allow property owners more freedom to destroy
works created by artists than to modify them. 81 Although de-
struction is a more extreme measure than modification, the lat-
ter is often the more injurious to the welfare of the creator. 8 2
An altered work may constitute a continuous eyesore-one that
misrepresents the author and portrays her art pejoratively to
the public. Modification may hurt not only the author's honor
and reputation, 8 3 but also hinder the attainment of important
goods, such as self-respect, self-fulfillment, and accomplish-
ment. 184 In contrast, a destroyed work ceases to exist and so
179. Zamir, supra note 177, at 242 ("[A] person may regularly eat junk food
or read pulp fiction and at the same time be unhappy with these choices, wish-
ing his eating and reading preferences were different."). The existence of first-
and second-order preferences is famously illustrated by the story of Ulysses
and the sirens. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-111 (rev. ed. 1984).
180. A different explanation for such intervention can rest on the idea that
a free and democratic society requires minimum standards of decency and
fairness, that treat every person with equal concern and respect. This frame-
work of minimal standards defines the contours of social life and structures
contractual and social relationships. Accordingly, certain conditions, terms or
clauses may be deemed unacceptable. For elaboration of this argument, see
generally Joseph William Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for
Granted: Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Demo-
cratic Society (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 136, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=946108.
181. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
182. See Merryman, supra note 135, at 1035 (conceding that damage to a
work of art may sometimes be worse than destruction of the work).
183. "Honor" and "reputation" are the phrases used in moral rights legisla-
tion. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Indeed, courts have relied on
these terms to deny the extension of moral rights to the case of destruction.
Garson, supra note 141, at 218.
184. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. The claim that moral
rights aim at enhancing an objective conception of welfare is strengthened by
EXPLORATION IN PROPERTY LAW
cannot inflict these damages, or at least not to the same ex-
tent.185
2. Preventing Mistakes and Misconceptions
The discussion in the previous Section assumed that the
property transferees are clearly able to satisfy the conditions. It
therefore focused on the effect that such compliance will have
on their welfare. This assumption does not always hold. When
conditions are not easily met, there are additional reasons for
preferring extreme measures to moderate ones.
Recall the issue of restriction on alienation by tenants. We
observed that the law is more tolerant of extreme, absolute
prohibitions on transferring the lease than it is of moderate,
conditioned transfers. The former type of restriction is general-
ly enforceable, even if the landlord's refusal to accept a prospec-
tive new tenant is arbitrary or capricious.1 86 If, however, the
lease allows for alienation provided the tenant receives the
landlord's consent, such consent must be granted unless there
is an objectively reasonable ground for refusal. 8 7
This peculiar, unequal legal treatment can be justified.
Imagine an opposite legal rule, one that permits landlords to
withhold their consent under a conditioned-transfer clause for
any reason, or even for no reason at all. Such complete discre-
tionary freedom is tantamount to an outright prohibition on
alienation by tenants. This is because even if a lease explicitly
forbids any transfer, the tenant may still try to convince the
landlord to accept a replacement when the issue arises in prac-
the fact that these rights are nontransferable. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b), (e) (2000).
In addition, the law severely restricts the waiver of moral rights. In the United
States, such waiver must be stated explicitly and contained in a written, suffi-
ciently detailed, and signed document. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e); 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 141, § 8D.06[D]; David Nimmer & Eric J. Schwartz, Unit-
ed States, in 2 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 7[4], at USA-
117 (Paul Edward Geller ed., 1994). Some countries, such as France, do not
allow waiver of moral rights at all. Pascal Kamina & Andre Lucas, France, in
1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra, § 7[4], at FR-109..
185. In a somewhat similar vein, the torturing of an animal can be viewed
as worse than the extreme act of killing it (if the latter act is done without in-
flicting pain). Arguably, mistreatment and abuse are particularly odious not
only for their effect on the animal's welfare, but also for their long-term effect
on the torturer's well-being. This may explain why animal protection laws ei-
ther do not refer to killing at all, or create a carve-out for the killing of animals
by their owners. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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tice.188 The landlord is free to agree or refuse, in the same way
as under our hypothetical complete-discretion conditioned-
transfer rule. The two rules are thus equivalent in terms of the
landlord's interests; but not so from the tenants' point of view.
Whereas the absolute prohibition clause is clear and unequi-
vocal, the conditioned-transfer clause is more ambiguous and
open to misunderstanding. When the lease indicates that alie-
nation is a viable option, tenants may mistakenly believe that
they are entitled to transfer their right (as long as they find an
objectively suitable candidate), and that landlords would not
unreasonably withhold their consent. Therefore, a rule subject-
ing a conditioned-transfer clause to a reasonableness test pro-
tects tenants from confusion, by giving landlords an incentive
to state in unequivocal terms their preference for total control
over the choice of prospective tenants.
Behavioral studies confirm the likelihood of such mistakes
on the part of tenants. First, there is a well-documented, pre-
vailing cognitive bias toward overoptimism.1 8 9 Even people who
are factually informed about particular risks often underesti-
mate the likelihood that such risks will materialize in their
case. 190 Thus, for instance, notwithstanding correct information
about the chances of being involved in an automobile accident,
suffering a heart attack or divorcing from one's spouse, most
individuals overconfidently believe that they are much less
likely than the average person to experience these events. 19 1
188. See 1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 356 ("A landlord may waive a re-
striction against assignment or subletting."); SMITH, supra note 88, at 97 (ex-
plaining that even under an absolute prohibition covenant, a landlord may
give the tenant a license to carry out a particular transaction).
189. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659-61 (1998) (describing the overoptim-
ism phenomenon).
190. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
1, 4 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
191. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17
LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 439, 443-47 (1993) (finding that, notwithstanding accu-
rate knowledge about the rate of divorce, individuals about to be married were
confident that it would not happen to them. Such unrealistic optimism was
also demonstrated by law students participating in a course on family law);
David M. DeJoy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception, 21
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333, 336-37 (1989) (observing excessive
optimism with regard to driving competency and the risk of causing auto acci-
dents); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 809-12 (1980) [hereinafter Weinstein,
Future Life Events] (analyzing overoptimism with respect to personal and pro-
fessional prospects); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Suscepti-
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Overoptimism is especially prevalent with respect to occur-
rences perceived by people as (at least somewhat) under their
control. 192 Second, people tend to think that others will treat
them fairly and decently.193 Thus, for example, although res-
pondents in an experiment on perceptions of divorce estimated
that only forty percent of spouses who have been awarded ali-
mony or child support actually receive these payments, they
confidently predicted that their own spouse would fully comply
with the court's decision. 94 It is therefore highly likely that a
tenant signing.a conditioned-transfer lease would believe she
stood a very good chance of persuading the landlord to grant
permission, and would discount the possibility that the latter
would arbitrarily withhold consent. 195
Overconfidence in this regard may be reinforced by another
well-known behavioral phenomenon. Cognitive studies have
observed that people's evaluation of a situation depends on the
way in which the relevant data has been presented to them.196
In particular, an individual's evaluation is made in relation to a
certain reference point or status quo, which, in turn, deter-
mines whether a scenario is framed as one that involves gain or
loss. 1 97 As Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman's prospect theory
bility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J.
BEHAV. MED. 481, 487-89 (1987) (finding unrealistic optimism with regard to
health hazards).
192. SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION
AND THE HEALTHY MIND 36-39 (1989); DeJoy, supra note 191, at 336, 338;
Jeffrey Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skep-
tics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 747 (2000); Weinstein,
Future Life Events, supra note 191, at 814, 819.
193. Baker & Emery, supra note 191, at 443 (observing such beliefs with
respect to receiving alimony and child support payments).
194. Id.
195. The opposite behavioral phenomenon of overpessimism, or overesti-
mation of risks, is expected to occur when a negative event that one cannot
control (or affect) becomes highly salient or threatening, such as after wide
media coverage of a nuclear power plant accident or a natural disaster. W. KIP
VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
150 (1992) (stating that people overestimate the likelihood of events such as
death by tornado, but underestimate risks such as heart disease or stroke);
Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probabil-
ity Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 569-70
(1989); Jolls, supra note 189, at 1662-63. Overpessimism is less likely to cha-
racterize ordinary contractual relationships, such as landlord and tenant,
where both parties exercise at least some degree of control over the ensuing
outcomes, and the relevant contingencies are unlikely to be very salient.
196. Sunstein, supra note 190, at 6.
197. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979); Amos Tversky & Da-
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famously demonstrated, an inflicted loss "hurts" much more
than an un-obtained gain of the same magnitude. 198
Compare, once again, a total prohibition clause with a
complete discretion, conditioned-transfer clause. As explained
above, both rules enable (or are designed to enable) landlords to
refuse consent for any reason at all. Tenants, however, are like-
ly to perceive the two rules very differently. A clause unequivo-
cally prohibiting alienation conveys the message that no right
of transfer exists. Although a tenant may try at some point in
the future to convince the landlord to allow a transfer, her ref-
erence point, or the status quo, is that she is not entitled to
transfer her lease. Renegotiation of this issue would therefore
be viewed by the tenant as involving the possibility of obtaining
a gain. Consequently, failure on her part would be more readily
accepted, and its adverse impact on her mitigated. By contrast,
a conditioned-transfer clause might reasonably be regarded by
the tenant as creating a right to alienate, albeit a qualified one.
The Landlord's subsequent refusal would thus be viewed as in-
flicting a loss which, in turn, would increase the negative im-
pact on the tenant and her frustration from not being able to
exercise what she perceived as her right. 199
For these reasons, we should not regret that imposing a
reasonableness requirement on the landlord's exercise of her
contractual discretion to withhold consent, may prompt some
landlords to put in the lease agreement an outright prohibition
on any transfer by the tenant. On the contrary, unequal legal
treatment of prohibition and conditioned-transfer clauses can
prevent tenants' mistakes, and reduce their potential, subse-
quent losses by dividing landlords at the outset into two
groups: those willing to submit to a reasonableness standard
and those insisting on complete control. The former will contin-
ue to use conditioned-transfer clauses, which will henceforth
correspond to the understanding by both parties that consent
niel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS.
S251, S257-62 (1986) (discussing the effect of framing on the evaluation of
outcomes and showing, among other things, how people's preferences change
when a frame is shifted from one involving the number of lives saved to one
involving the number of lives lost).
198. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 197, at 265-69; Daniel Kahneman
et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and the Status Quo Bias, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 193, 199-201 (1991).
199. For these reasons, even if a tenant is overoptimistic regarding her
chances of persuading the landlord to waive a complete prohibition clause, her
failure to do so will be less harmful to her welfare than in the case of a condi-
tioned-transfer clause.
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cannot be unreasonably withheld. The latter will make use of
prohibition clauses, which clearly reflect the true state of af-
fairs with respect to the possibility of alienation. The law thus
assists in creating two unambiguous, distinct paths for lan-
dlord-tenant relationships.
A caveat is in order. For the purposes of this Article, I need
not take a stand on whether total deference to alienation-
prohibition clauses is justified. One may argue, for instance,
that freedom of contract should be limited in both cases, i.e.,
that both prohibition and conditioned-transfer clauses should
be subject to a reasonableness test. 20 0 I do submit, however,
that if we believe landlords should have the power to veto alie-
nation by tenants completely, there is good reason to require
that such contractual terms be phrased in an extreme and un-
ambiguous fashion.
The foregoing analysis is not limited to alienation control
clauses in lease agreements. It is generally applicable to condi-
tions attached to rights that are not easily fulfilled but might
mistakenly appear to be so. Another example of this kind is a
bequest conditioned on the donee marrying within a short pe-
riod of time a person who meets certain restrictive criteria. 20 1
The potential recipient of the gift may overconfidently believe
that she will easily satisfy the condition, and so rely to her de-
triment on the expectation of enjoying the bequest. In this type
of case, the practical difference between having no right from
the outset and having a conditioned right that is difficult to
meet is relatively small. 20 2
Viewed from this perspective, legal rules that interfere
more with moderate-phrased measures than with extreme-
phrased ones, can be understood as debiasing devices. By en-
couraging the party granting a right to frame it in uncondi-
tioned and unambiguous terms, rather than in a moderate,
conditioned manner which might be misleading, these rules re-
duce cognitive biases, such as the overoptimism bias. 20 3
200. Such is the case in Israeli Law. Hire and Loan Law, 5731-1971, 25 LSI
152, § 22 (1972) (Isr.).
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 &
cmts. b-c (1983) (stating that a condition that unreasonably limits the donee's
opportunity to marry is invalid); see also supra note 44.
202. For examples outside of property law, see infra notes 326-41 and ac-
companying text.
203. This debiasing method is different from the methods discussed by
Jolls and Sunstein, who recommend using the availability and framing biases
to correct consumer overoptimism. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debias-
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B. REDUCING THE INCIDENCE OF Low-VALUING OWNERS
The preceding justifications for greater intervention with
moderate measures relating to property focused on the protec-
tion of prospective transferees. This Section offers a totally dif-
ferent reason for rejecting the MBL argument. At times, the
very employment of a moderate measure is a good proxy for
low-valuing owners. The same is not generally true of the exer-
cise of extreme measures.
Recall the issue of use versus nonuse of property. As ex-
plained above, the notion that "more is better than less" implies
that the liberty to extensively use one's property should include
the freedom to not use it.204 The more intansively a property
right is exercised, the greater the burden inflicted on those who
must respect the right and suffer the consequences of its use.205
It therefore seems that allowing nonuse of property grants
more freedom to such people and at the same time respects
owners' choices regarding their property.20 6 This depiction of a
win-win situation, however, conceals the "darker" side of non-
use of property rights.
The value of property may be intimately connected with,
and dependent on, its actual use. This is particularly true of
property rights created for a specific, narrow purpose that can-
not be unilaterally altered or expanded. Take, for instance, a
right of way through another person's land. The servitude's sole
goal is to enable passage. If the owner neither uses the servi-
tude for a lengthy period nor attempts to transfer it or nego-
tiate a change in its scope, one can reasonably infer that the
servitude has little (or no) value to her. There may be no fur-
ing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 209-11 (2006). The first technique
employs "horror stories" that make the risk more immediate or salient in
people's minds, and thus increases their assessment of the likelihood of its oc-
currence. Id. at 209-10. The second method frames the situation as one that
involves losses rather than gains, the idea being that individuals will make a
greater effort to avoid harm than they will to acquire a comparable benefit. Id.
at 210-11. In contrast, I argue that debiasing can also be achieved by encour-
aging the framing of a situation as one that is unconditioned or certain. If a
given scenario is framed as involving little uncertainty-or none at all-then
overoptimism would be reduced or not arise at all.
204. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
205. Recall the example of an easement holder's frequent use as a burden
on the servient estate owner. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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ther need for a right of way at all, 207 or the servitude holder
may have long ago switched to another, more convenient means
of access. Why then does she not expressly relinquish the right?
This question may be answered through the examination of two
plausible scenarios: nonstrategic nonuse and strategic nonuse.
1. Nonstrategic Nonuse
One possible explanation for not actively relinquishing an
unused and unneeded servitude is that its owner simply has
not bothered to do so. The acquisition of the right208 is typically
a sunken cost. Affirmatively relinquishing a right and the
communication of this fact to the relevant parties entail new
costs in terms of thought, time, and money.209 The marginal
costs of contemplating the alternative courses of action with re-
spect to one particular item of property that one owns might
outweigh the benefits. It may therefore be cheaper or easier to
do nothing at all, and leave the status of the title undisturbed.
Neglecting to search for other, more efficient users may
sometimes be due to the fact that the owner never paid the
property's full market value. She may have paid nothing at all
(as in the case of rights acquired by prescription), or only a re-
duced price (as in the case of rent-controlled housing). In both
instances, the fact that not all the costs of owning the property
have been internalized can lead owners to hold on to low-valued
rights and discount the possibility of relinquishing or transfer-
ring them to higher-valuing users.2 10
Furthermore, psychological studies have demonstrated
that people seek to avoid regret,21 1 and that regret looms larger
207. For example, a right of way for a restaurant's customers will no longer
be needed when the business on the dominant estate was replaced by a resi-
dence.
208. Such as the actual price paid (if the servitude was bought in a volun-
tary sale), or the years of active adverse use (if the servitude was acquired by
prescription).
209. Usually, in addition to the servient landowner, the land registry would
also have to be informed of the need to erase the servitude from the registry.
See, e.g., 76 C.J.S. Registration of Land Titles §§ 54-55 (1994) (noting the re-
quirement to register a servitude and the further requirement of a proceeding
in some jurisdictions to cancel a memorial of an easement).
210. See Epstein, supra note 86, at 762-63 (explaining how regulated rent
can distort housing allocation).
211. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Deci-
sion Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 38 (1988) (using "regret avoidance"
to explain people's bias in favor of the status quo).
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for commissions than for omissions.212 An economic loss from
an action generates stronger feelings of regret than a loss of
similar magnitude resulting from inaction.2 13 Thus, for exam-
ple, one study has shown that monetary loss from a decision to
move stock from one investment to another is perceived as
causing more regret than an equivalent loss from failing to
switch one's stocks to an alternative investment. 214 In a similar
vein, another study has demonstrated that people are reluctant
to exchange the lottery ticket in their hand for another one,
even when they are offered a financial incentive for making the
exchange and even when they do not believe their original tick-
et has a higher probability of winning. 215 The researchers found
that the anticipation of ex post regret from exchanging a ticket
and losing is greater than the regret from losing after refusing
to trade. 216
These phenomena support the contention that people may
be overly reluctant to part with low-valued property rights.
Such parting requires a commission, which is particularly
prone to the regret avoidance bias. 217 In contrast, holding on to
the property right involves an omission, which engenders lower
regret costs. Consequently, in order to minimize future regret,
individuals will unnecessarily hold on to unused property.
212. Id.
213. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias,
59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475, 476-77, 495-
96 (1994); Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Biases, 5
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 50, 59-60 (1992) [hereinafter Ritov & Baron,
Omission Biases]; Mark Spranca et al., Omission and Commission in Judg-
ment and Choice, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 76, 78-79, 101-03
(1991); see also THALER, supra note 161, at 73 (explaining this asymmetry by
the fact that people feel more blame and responsibility when voluntarily as-
suming a risk than when failing to reduce a risk); Lee Anne Fennell, Death,
Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 588-90 (2003) (using the regret
avoidance and omission/commission biases to explain the low rate of inter vi-
vos giving).
214. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences,
246 SCI. AM. 160, 173 (1982).
215. Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat Neter, Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange
Lottery Tickets?, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 18, 24-25 (1996).
Such reluctance was not manifested in an equivalent experiment that involved
the trading of pens. Id. at 23-24.
216. Id. at 25-26; see also Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to
Vaccinate: Commission Bias and Ambiguity, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 190, at 168, 184 (finding that people are reluctant to
vaccinate a child even when the risk of death from disease is significantly
higher than death from vaccinating against it).
217. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 211, at 38.
[92:634
EXPLORATION IN PROPERTY LAW
In this context, the comparison between nonuse and de-
struction of property is illuminating. Destruction is not suscept-
ible to the above problems, which may lead to inefficient choic-
es regarding property. A decision to destroy cannot be the
product of neglect, inertia or lack of thought. Destruction, by its
very nature, is much more likely to result from thoughtful
evaluation of alternative options. One main reason is that there
is no way back from it. A decision to destroy, once carried out,
is irreversible. It cannot be employed as a kind of default, to be
changed, perhaps, at some time in the future. The finality of
the act naturally draws the owner's attention to other possible
courses of action, and compels her to examine them carefully.
Specifically, when an owner chooses destruction, she will usual-
ly be aware of the fact that she is permanently forgoing all oth-
er options, including sale, lease, gift, and abandonment of the
property. Leaving aside such relatively rare cases as owner in-
sanity and accidental destruction, if an owner prefers destruc-
tion even over abandonment of her property, 218 then this indi-
cates the former action's high value for her. The fact that, in
practice, owners usually do not destroy valuable assets2 19
strengthens-rather than weakens-this argument. In those
special cases where owners intentionally opt for the destruction
of their property notwithstanding its market value, there is a
strong prima facie case that this extreme measure was taken
for good reason and that it is the efficient course of action. 220
Moreover, the cognitive biases described above strengthen
the argument regarding the differences between nonuse and
destruction. The choice to hold on to unused property (which
may be due to neglect, lack of knowledge and thought, or trans-
action costs) is further bolstered by aversion to regret. This
aversion, in turn, is reinforced by the omission/commission bi-
as, since holding on to property constitutes inaction, which en-
genders lower costs of regret.22 1 In contrast, a decision to de-
218. Abandonment renders an asset ownerless and enables another person
to take possession and become its new owner. Abandonment ordinarily re-
quires less effort on behalf of the original owner than destruction.
219. Honor6, supra note 23, at 118 ("Most people do not wilfully destroy
permanent assets ...."); McCaffery, supra note 132, at 86 ("[D]issipatory
waste is not common in our culture.").
220. Strahilevitz convincingly argues that destructive acts often promote
expressive values and that such acts should receive greater deference than
currently afforded under law. Strahilevitz, supra note 128, at 821-22, 824-26.
Examples of expressive destruction include burning a flag or a draft card. See
id.
221. See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
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stroy an asset represents not merely a commission, but an
versible one at that. As a result, it is subject to the highest po-
tential costs of regret. 222 Acts of destruction must overcome the
bias against regret-producing commissions in order to occur at
all. Consequently, higher nonexistence value and stronger rea-
sons than otherwise are needed to enable owners to prevail
over their cognitive bias. Since the omission/commission bias
operates against-rather than in favor of-destroying property,
it adds assurance that destruction is the consequence of ration-
al thought.
Before proceeding, an important caveat is in order. Of
course it is not the case that decisions to destroy can never be
mistaken. Owners may sometimes be unaware of the existence
of an individual whose valuation of the property surpasses
their own destruction value. 223 Similarly, noninternalization of
positive externalities might cause owners to demolish a build-
ing of architectural importance. 224 I do argue, however, that
there are important differences between nonuse and a decision
to destroy property, and that as a rule we have greater confi-
dence-albeit not absolute certainty-in the efficiency of the
latter.
Once the differences between nonuse and decisions to de-
stroy are revealed, their different legal treatment is easily ex-
plained. In this context too, intervention in the case of the more
222. Compare, for instance, an act of destruction with an act of alienation
(such as a sale). Although in both cases the owner parts with her asset, in the
latter case there remains a chance of repurchasing the asset in the future.
223. Strahilevitz recommends solving this problem, with respect to de-
structive instructions contained in wills, by requiring owners, while they are
still alive, to market the future interest in the property (that is, the ownership
of the property after their death). Strahilevitz, supra note 128, at 850. If the
owner's minimum asking price exceeds the highest bid in an auction of the fu-
ture interest, then she demonstrably values the property's destruction more
than anyone else values its preservation, and consequently the instruction in
her will to destroy the property should be honored. Id. at 850-51. Note that
Strahilevitz does not suggest a similar mechanism as a condition for permit-
ting owners to destroy property during their lifetime. Cf. id. at 851 (discussing
the posthumous restriction without application to inter vivos destruction).
Thus, he assumes that the risk of inefficient ante mortem destruction is too
small to warrant legal intervention. See also id. at 821-22 (generally arguing
in favor of a right to destroy).
224. On the public goods aspects of building preservation, see Lewinsohn-
Zamir, supra note 127, at 746-48. If we define the relevant property as "land
in its entirety," rather than "the structure erected on it," then the decision to
demolish may be viewed not as a case of property destruction, but as an in-
stance of changes in the utilization of the property (since demolition will
usually be followed by new development of the land).
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moderate measure of nonuse is more justifiable than regulation
of the extreme measure of destruction.
Since nonuse of property is less likely to be grounded in
sound reasons and more prone to cognitive biases, the law aims
to counteract these problems by stating that unused rights may
be lost. 225 At the same time, to minimize the risk of mistakes,
use-it-or-lose-it rules are not applied across the board to all
property rights, but are limited to cases where a significant pe-
riod of nonuse is a strong indicator of low-valuing owners. 226
For this reason, such rules typically target rights that were
created at the outset for a specific, narrow purpose that cannot
be unilaterally altered by the right holders. In these cases we
can rest assured that nonuse is not motivated by owners' wait-
ing until the time when their property is ripe for a better use.
This cautiousness explains why use-it-or-lose-it rules are
found with respect to trademarks, rent-controlled housing, wa-
ter rights, and to some extent servitudes as well.2 27 The whole
point of a trademark is its actual business-related use to enable
the identification of the source of goods and services. 228 Fur-
thermore, a trademark cannot be secured until the mark is
used in commerce. 229 Likewise, the sole purpose of rent control
is to supply affordable housing to those who would otherwise
lack it.230 Water rights and rights of way are similarly linked to
particular, limited kinds of enjoyment. By extinguishing un-
used rights of these types the law reduces instances of low val-
uation by right holders while saving on the transaction costs
225. See supra Part I.B.2.
226. For example, use-it-or-lose-it rules are applied to trademarks, rent-
controlled housing, water rights, and certain types of servitudes. See BRUCE &
ELY, supra note 101, § 10:19, at 10-39 to -40; DOLAN, supra note 86, § 2:39, at
144-45; KANE, supra note 65, § 1:1.1; 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 37, § 50.09(gg), at 751.
227. For criticism of the majority rule, which does not suffice with naked
nonuse for terminating servitudes, see infra notes 301-02 and accompanying
text.
228. 15 U.S.C.A § 1127 (West Supp. 2007) ("[T]he intent of this chapter is
to regulate commerce."); KANE, supra note 65, § 1:1.1 (noting that the critical
element of trademarks is to "identify and distinguish one company's products
from another's").
229. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 78, at 223-24; KANE, supra note 65,
§§ 1:1.5[E], 1:3, 5:1.1, 5:1.10; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 67, §§ 16:1-16:2.
230. See, e.g., KEATING ET AL., supra note 87, at 3 ("[R]ent controls typically
have been imposed ... when rents increased beyond the ability of many te-
nants to pay without hardship.").
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associated with freeing scarce resources 231 for more efficient
uses.
2 3 2
According to this rationale, it is not surprising that nonuse
does not in and of itself extinguish ownership of land, and that
a nonuse plus regime applies instead.23 3 Contrary to the above
examples, ownership of land enables many potential and di-
verse enjoyments, some of which may be realized only in the fu-
ture. It may very well be the case that land is presently unuti-
lized because it is not yet ripe for development or because the
owner is waiting for the time when a better use can be made.2 34
Thus, a use-it-or-lose-it rule might create inefficient incentives
for premature development. 235 Consequently, nonuse of land by
231. Peck, supra note 94, at 801-02 (describing the scarcity of water rights
in Kansas); Jacobson, supra note 94, at 182 (stating that water in the western
states "is scarce and demand is consequently very high"). The limited recogni-
tion of instream flow rights held by individuals is compatible with the above
argument. See supra note 100. First, the need for water preservation must be
positively demonstrated and cannot be deduced from mere nonuse. See, e.g.,
Sterne, supra note 100, at 227-29 (noting the positive need requirements for
Arizona and Alaska, as well as Alaska's further requirement that the reserva-
tion be in the public interest). When such proof is presented by the right hold-
er, the issue of inefficient nonuse will not arise. Second, my explanation for the
use-it-or-lose-it rule applies to the value of a consumptive use right (for exam-
ple, a right to divert a certain quantity of the water source) to its nonusing
owner. Once this low valued right is extinguished, the identity of the efficient
alternative can be debated. Efficiency considerations may favor either a new
consumptive user or that the consumptive right be converted into an instream-
preservation right.
232. Abolition of unused rights saves, for instance, on the costs of negotiat-
ing their transfer from the original owner to new users, or of their voluntary
relinquishment by the former.
233. For example, rights in land may be lost via adverse possession. See
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 82, at 853; see also supra notes 117-19 and
accompanying text.
234. SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 73 (stating that idle land sometimes serves
a high-value purpose, for instance, a developer may wish to leave his land un-
touched because he is planning to build on it in the future, and an environ-
mentalist owner may desire to maintain land in its pristine condition for the
benefit of wildlife); Fennell, supra note 32, at 1064 (arguing that a passive use
of land may actually increase overall societal value); Jeff M. Netter et al., An
Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
217, 219 (1986) ("[Olptimizing behavior does not require that land be conti-
nuously in service. For example, a tract of land's most valuable use might be
in the future and it does not pay the owner to employ it in any other manner
until then."); see also John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Ad-
verse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 857-62 (1994) (asserting that pre-
servation of wild lands in their natural condition may be socially preferable to
economic development by adverse possessors).
235. In a related context, it was claimed that homesteading acts which
condition the grant of land on residency and improvement by settlers are inef-
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owners is not a sufficiently persuasive indication of the owners'
low valuation of their property.
Once again, the case of destruction differs from that of
nonuse. Since an owner's decision to destroy her property is
more likely to be justified and less susceptible to cognitive bi-
ases, 236 there is no need for a general law prohibiting the de-
struction of property. Indeed, no such law exists. 237 The differ-
ences between destruction and moderate measures relating to
property can also explain why cultural property legislation is
limited to regulation of issues such as export restrictions and
rights of preemption. 23 8 There is greater risk of mistake in ex-
port decisions-which are reversible and so do not necessarily
draw attention to the costs inflicted on third parties (the gener-
al public of the country of origin)-than in destruction choices.
In summary, although destruction is the most extreme
measure an owner can take with regard to her property-the
one that entails the most significant and irreversible conse-
quences-there is less need for state regulation of this act and
a stronger case for governmental deference to the owner's
wishes.
2. Strategic Nonuse
Neglect, inertia, and lack of thought or information are not
the only reasons for holding on to unused property. A different
reason for not relinquishing unused rights is their "blackmail"
value. For example, even if a right of way has no value to the
holder who does not intend ever to use it in the future, its very
existence can be utilized to extract gain from the servient lan-
downer. Although property rights as rights in rem generally
bind the whole world,239 they often affect certain people much
more than others. While it is true that everyone must respect
the servitude holder's right,240 it is equally clear that the ser-
vient landowner is especially burdened by the servitude, and to
a much greater extent than third parties in general. Even
though the right of way is not used at all, its very existence
ficient, because they encourage premature development of land. Terry L. An-
derson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 J.L. & ECON. 177, 178,
181-82, 189-91 (1990).
236. See supra notes 211-22 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
238. See JOTE, supra note 144, at 158-61.
239. LAWSON & RUDDEN, supra note 127, at 2-3.
240. Id. at 127-28.
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may preclude the most efficient use of the servient estate. The
right of way's location, for instance, may prevent the replace-
ment of a small villa on the servient land with a high rise con-
dominium permitted under a new zoning ordinance. By refus-
ing to relinquish the unused right of way which is otherwise of
no value to her, the servitude owner exploits her monopoly po-
sition to transfer wealth from the servient landowner to herself.
In a similar vein, a tenant's right to enjoy the rent-controlled
apartment burdens the landlord more heavily than all others.
Even if the apartment remains vacant, the right of tenancy
prevents the landlord from putting it to any other use and rea-
lizing its full market value. Consequently, the tenant can use
her property right to extract a profit from the landlord.
Such pure transfers of wealth are unjustifiable. From an
efficiency point of view, they constitute a needless waste of re-
sources. Furthermore, the wealth transfer cannot be supported
by distributive considerations. There is no reason to believe
that property owners who hold out are, as a group, significantly
less well-off than the people from whom they attempt to extract
gain.241
One may object that even assuming unused or obsolete
rights should be terminated, this fact alone does not support
their coerced (rather than voluntary) abolition. Carol Rose, for
instance, argues that "[t]he right to 'hold out,' for whatever idi-
otic reasons, is an aspect of the right to hold property."242 Ri-
chard Epstein similarly states that "[t]o say that ordinary own-
ership presents a holdout problem is not to identify a defect in
the system; it is to identify one of its essential strengths."243 A
main justification for insisting on voluntary termination is our
fear of institutional mistakes. As outsiders, we may genuinely
believe that a certain right is no longer valuable to its holder,
or that an alternative use of a resource is superior, but our be-
liefs may be erroneous. 244 What appears to us as a market fail-
241. Tenants as a group are usually considered to be less wealthy than
landlords, who have at least one other apartment for their own residence.
However, a tenant who does not exercise her right to reside on the premises
also has another place to live in. For elaboration of this point, see infra Part
II.C.
242. Rose, supra note 29, at 1412.
243. Epstein, supra note 49, at 1367. Epstein applies this general argu-
ment to the servitude context as well: "The power of the original party to hold
out, to maintain his servitude against his neighbor, marks the vitality of nas-
cent ownership." Id.
244. Rose, supra note 29, at 1412 ("Sometimes the purported holdout has a
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ure may actually be the continuation of an efficient status quo.
Moreover, even if we correctly identify a potential for an effi-
cient change, we might still err in our objective estimation of
the magnitude of the right holder's loss. 245 Undercompensation
can undermine people's incentives to invest in, and develop,
their assets.246 For these reasons we ordinarily do not regard
external evaluations as sufficient, and we require the owners'
consent to the transfer or termination of their property rights.
Note that the above justification for obtaining consent is
instrumental. 247 It is based on the assumption that the danger
of market failure is considerably smaller than the risk of ineffi-
cient coercion. I agree that when transaction costs are reasona-
bly low, it is generally wise to protect entitlements with proper-
ty rules. 248 Consensual transactions increase the utility to both
parties by allowing them to trade their allotted shares for oth-
genuine interest in his property right, however irrationally inflated that inter-
est may seem to the world at large.").
245. Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner:
One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 570-71 (1993).
246. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Compensation for Injuries to Land Caused
by Planning Authorities: Towards a Comprehensive Theory, 46 U. TORONTO
L.J. 47, 61-62, 65-66 (1996).
247. Carol Rose, for instance, acknowledges the legitimacy of preventing
opportunistic holdouts if we can adequately distinguish between the former
cases and those where owners have a genuine, subjectively high evaluation of
their property. Rose, supra note 29, at 1412. My argument is directed toward
such a nonlibertarian, utilitarian approach, whose objection to nonconsensual
termination is mainly instrumental.
248. An entitlement is protected by a "property rule" if no one can appro-
priate the entitlement without securing its owner's consent. Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092, 1105-07 (1972). The en-
titlement must be transferred through a voluntary transaction, and its price
agreed to by the owner-seller. Id. "Liability rule" protection, in contrast,
enables a forced transfer of the entitlement. Id. The coercing party need not
seek the owner's permission, but only pay her the objectively determined value
of the entitlement. Id. Calabresi and Melamed argued that property rules
should be used when transaction costs are low and the parties can bargain
with one another to achieve desirable outcomes. Id. at 1106-07, 1118-19. Lia-
bility rules, in contrast, are best applied when transaction costs are high and
bargaining is impossible or difficult. Id. at 1106-10, 1118-19. The criterion of
transaction costs, with its attendant recommendations regarding the choice
and content of legal rules, was adopted in subsequent scholarly writing. See,
e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 450-51 (1995); Tho-
mas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory
of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 367-70 (1984); see also Lewin-
sohn-Zamir, supra note 162 (applying behavioral studies to vindicate the use
of property rules :hen transaction costs are low).
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ers that they prefer, and thus reallocate goods to those who
value them most. 249 Nevertheless, in circumstances where the
risks involved in objective evaluations are substantially dimi-
nished, involuntary termination may emerge as a superior op-
tion. I claim that this is the case with respect to unused proper-
ty rights, provided certain conditions are met. The right must
not have been used for a significant period of time. Noninten-
sive but continuous use is not a reliable indicator of low valua-
tion by the property owner.250 In addition, the property right
must be of the kind that entitles its holder only to a specific en-
joyment, which is either unattained at all (by the owner herself
or by a third party of her choice) or else is realized by other
means.
When these conditions are fulfilled, nonuse can be a good
proxy for low valuation. If a right created for a particular pur-
pose is left unused for a lengthy period without its holder at-
tempting either to dispose of it or to negotiate a change in its
scope, then we may reasonably conclude that the value of the
right is in its blackmail potential. This conclusion can be sup-
ported by evidence that the purpose which the right was in-
tended to serve is achieved by other means. An example is a
servitude owner who for a period of many years does not use
the right of way to which she is entitled, but rather uses an al-
ternative route.251
Once the risk of erroneous termination of rights is suffi-
ciently reduced, we should not bear the costs of bargaining for
pure transfers of wealth to transferees who cannot be regarded
as appropriate targets for redistribution. Involuntary abolition
avoids dissipation of value through unnecessary negotiations
and avoids the risk that such negotiations will fail. 252 In con-
249. SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 18.
250. Id. at 73.
251. As explained above, the American doctrine of servitude abandonment
usually requires more than naked nonuse, see supra notes 108-09 and accom-
panying text, and the doctrine of changed conditions requires the impossibility
of either use or realization of purpose, see supra note 113. Hence, nonuse of
the servitude coupled with use of an alternative ordinarily does not lead to its
termination.
252. Bilateral monopoly may hinder efficient transactions. When there is
only one seller and one buyer for a particular entitlement (as is the case when
negotiating a release from an easement or a rent-controlled tenancy) and the
parties have imperfect information about the other's true valuation, mutual
attempts to capture the potential gains from the trade may result in bargain-
ing failure. SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 89-91; Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass
and Nuisance, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra note 66, at 617, 619;
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trast, when the danger of mistaken intervention is substantial,
use-it-or-lose-it rules should not be-and in fact are not-
created. As explained above, one such example is ownership of
land, which allows for numerous and diverse enjoyments, some
of which will be attainable only in the future. Hence, we cannot
deduce low valuation from present nonuse alone. 253
The same reasoning can account for the differing legal
treatment of trademarks and copyrights in this context. Where-
as trademarks can be lost if not used, copyrighted works do not
lose their protection if similarly unutilized. 254 The value of a
trademark is intimately connected to its actual use in com-
merce, and its purpose is to identify the source of particular
goods and services (as a signifier of their attributes, quality,
prestige, etc).255 The trademark's value is wholly instrumental,
not intrinsic. Since continuous nonuse can adequately signify
low valuation by the trademark owner, a use-it-or-lose-it rule is
justified. A copyright-in contrast to trademarks and like own-
ership of land-allows for diverse exclusive uses, such as the
right to copy, distribute, and display the protected work, and to
Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
71-73 (1987).
253. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. Another difference
between land ownership and rights in land that fall short of full ownership
pertains to the magnitude of the burden inflicted on others. See, e.g., BRUCE &
ELY, supra note 101, § 1.1. As explained above, a right that is less than owner-
ship inflicts a direct and special burden on the owner of the land, even if it is
not exercised. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text. This burden is
much heavier than the general burden of respect and non-interference that
property rights impose on third parties. Hence, there is both the potential and
the incentive to employ the unexercised lesser right to extract gains from the
landowner. In contrast, an owner not using her land burdens third parties
equally and to a much lesser extent. Typically, she does not enjoy a monopoly
position, and third parties would be able to acquire desired rights in other
lands. Thus, nonuse cannot be employed by the owner as a form of blackmail.
This difference strengthens the case for distinguishing between landowners
and other right holders in land who do not use their rights. Cf. Laura S. Un-
derkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033,
1038 (1996). Professor Underkuffler generally argues, without distinguishing
between different kinds of property rights, that property rights differ from
other constitutional rights (such as freedom of speech or due process of law) in
that by granting them we necessarily deny or take the same resources from
others. Id. at 1038-39, 1042. I agree that in a world of scarce resources, alloca-
tion of certain property to someone comes at the expense of allocating it to
others. Nonetheless, I submit that property rights differ in the extent to which
they burden others, and that this difference may be relevant in formulating
legal rules.
254. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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prepare derivative works. 25 6 As a result, there may be various
good reasons for nonuse of the copyrighted work. A copyright
owner may, for instance, prefer nonuse because the best use of
her work-adapting her book for a television series-will be
feasible only in the future. She may therefore refrain from oth-
er uses until the use she prefers can be realized, in order to en-
sure the public's interest in the adaptation. Furthermore, a co-
pyrighted work often has intrinsic-in addition to
instrumental-value. Thus, an artist may attribute high value
to the very existence of her sculpture, which is a manifestation
of her talent, creativity and achievement, even if she does not
intend to put it to any practical use. Nonuse, therefore, is a
poor proxy for low valuation.257 Alternatively, even if an artist
decides not to authorize any use of her early work because she
believes it is not up to standard and its dissemination would
hurt her reputation, her refusal to "use" the work by herself or
to authorize its use by third parties is genuine-aimed at pre-
venting harm to herself-and not strategic. 258
256. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 142, at 382.
257. One may argue that this conclusion gradually changes as more and
more years pass from the initial creation of the copyrighted work. A copyright
lasts for a long period of time-the life of the author plus seventy years. See
supra note 68. It may therefore be the case that after many years have gone by
(yet well before the statutory expiration date), all the potential uses of the
work have been exhausted. When such a point has been reached, wouldn't
lengthy nonuse become a good proxy for low valuation and a use-it-or-lose-it
rule thus justified? I believe not. Even if all the uses and adaptations of a co-
pyrighted work have been realized, it may still have high intrinsic value for its
owner (as explained in the text). Although this may not be true for each and
every work, the existence and pervasiveness of this phenomenon precludes the
adoption of an across-the-board use-it-or-lose-it rule.
258. Patent nonuse-like copyright nonuse-is not a reliable indicator of
low value to its owner. One possible reason for noncommercialization of a pa-
tent is that the resulting product would compete with another product that the
owner has developed and commercialized. 3 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION § 708b-d (2005); Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and
the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 389, 392-94 (2002); Julie S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Pa-
tent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179,
183-84 (1998). The new technology is nevertheless registered as a patent in
order to block the patent owner's competitors from registering a similar pa-
tent. Strahilevitz, supra note 128, at 809-11; Turner, supra, at 184-85. The
question whether patent suppression is a legitimate activity is beyond the
scope of this Article. For present purposes, it suffices to note that nonuse of
patents may be due to various reasons. Although nonuse in the above example
is strategic, it is not due to the patent holder's low valuation of her patent.
Quite the contrary-the patent remains unused precisely because it is valua-
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Similar analysis can account for the unsympathetic legal
treatment of cybersquatting compared to the relative toleration
of land speculation. At first glance, the two activities have
much in common. A cybersquatter strategically registers a do-
main name that consists of a name of a well-known trademark
or individual, in order to profit from selling the domain name
(usually to the latter) for a considerable price. 259 A land specu-
lator strategically buys and assembles parcels of land she does
not intend to occupy or utilize herself, and keeps them from the
market until she can maximize profits by selling them to devel-
opers. 260 Typically, in both cases the property is unused from
the outset by the original owner, who doesn't value it in and of
itself. Rather, it is the expectation of extracting profits from
high-valuing future owners that motivates the initial acquisi-
tion of the property.26 1 Yet, while cybersquatting gives rise to
civil liability, 262 land-speculation does not.263 Moreover, the re-
medies against cybersquatters include forfeiture or cancellation
ble. Therefore, it is unsurprising that patent law does not extinguish unused
patents. See Turner, supra, at 202-04. The suggested remedies for illegitimate
patent suppression are protecting an infringed unused patent only with liabili-
ty rules, or compulsory licensing of the patent to others. See Saunders, supra,
at 434-39.
259. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1125(d)(1)(A), 1129(1)(A) (West Supp. 2007). The former section deals with
cyberpiracy of trademarks and the latter addresses cyberpiracy of individuals'
names. For descriptions of cybersquatting activities, see S. REP. NO. 106-140,
at 5 (1999); Adam Silberlight, Domain Name Disputes Under the ACPA in the
New Millennium: When Is Bad Faith Intent to Profit Really Bad Faith and
Has Anything Changed with the ACPA's Inception?, 13 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269, 270-71 (2002); and John D. Mercer, Note, Cy-
bersquatting: Blackmail on the Information Superhighway, 6 B.U. J. SCi. &
TECH. L. 290, 293, 308-09 (2000).
260. C.E. Elias, Jr. & James Gillies, Some Observations on the Role of Spe-
culators and Speculation in Land Development, 12 UCLA L. REV. 789, 792
(1965).
261. Id. at 790 (stating that a speculator "buys the commodity because of
his expectation of profits; he does not buy for use"); Jian Xiao, The First Wave
of Cases Under the ACPA, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159, 161 (2002) (noting
that most cybersquatters merely register domain names and never use them
as actual website addresses).
262. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A), 1129(1)(A).
263. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 266 (1985)
(stating that few jurisdictions have adopted the antispeculation policy of tax-
ing speculative gains). Fischel criticizes such policy for penalizing people who
sold their land at the right time and rewarding-by lower taxation-those who
sold too quickly or waited too long. Id. at 267.
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of the domain name and transfer of the domain name to the
plaintiff.264
Further thought, however, reveals important differences
between the two activities. Land speculation can serve useful
purposes. Professional land speculators can promote orderly
city growth and prevent premature development and urban
sprawl, by delaying development until the time is ripe, and sell-
ing the land for its most valuable use.265 Indeed, some scholars
have argued that rules of first possession, preemption rights for
squatters and homesteading acts encourage inefficient competi-
tion between individuals to take possession or develop land
prematurely. 266 In contrast to land speculation, cybersquatting
has no advantages, and is a socially wasteful activity.267 It
merely transfers income from the person or trademark owner
that truly values the domain name, since it is their own name
or is associated with their product, to the squatter (who does
not value the right apart from its blackmail potential). The
search and early registration by squatters of such domain
names have no social value, since they "create" a resource that
either would have been created anyway (by the obvious trade-
mark owner targeted for extortion), or need not be created at
all (since the individual whose name is identical to the domain
name places a high value on her privacy). 268
264. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125(d)(1)(C), 1129(2).
265. FISCHEL, supra note 263, at 265-66; J. Anthony Coughlan, Land Val-
ue Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity, 7 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 261, 261
n.3 (1999); Elias & Gillies, supra note 260, at 791-93, 797; Merrill, supra note
16, at 1130.
266. Anderson & Hill, supra note 235, at 179-82, 189-91 (explaining why
land speculation is less problematic than preemption for squatters and homes-
teading requirements); David D. Haddock, First Possession Versus Optimal
Timing: Limiting the Dissipation of Economic Value, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 775,
776-78, 791-92 (1986) (discussing the inefficiencies of first possession rules).
267. See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Sel-
ler and User Liability in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 43
(1999) (stating that cybersquatting is not socially productive).
268. Arguably, another reason to differentiate between land speculation
and cybersquatting is that the latter may also harm third parties, by confus-
ing or defrauding consumers. Indeed, this problem was expressly acknowl-
edged by the legislature. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 5-6 (1999). Note, howev-
er, that the consumer protection motivation is only applicable to
cybersquatting with respect to trademarks, and not to cybersquatting relating
to names of individuals. In the latter case, the sole goal of the legislation is to
prevent the extraction of money from a person. Such a case was successfully
litigated in Schmidheiny v. Weber, wherein the defendants offered to sell the
domain name "schmidheiny.com" to the plaintiff for $1.1 million. 285 F. Supp.
2d 613, 618 (2003). The court enjoined the defendants from registering a do-
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Once again, it is instructive to compare the case of nonuse
with that of destruction of property. A decision not to use ordi-
narily does not harm the asset, and can be reversed. Therefore,
nonuse can serve strategic purposes and facilitate the extrac-
tion of profits. In contrast, since there is no way back from de-
stroying an asset, destruction is usually an inadequate way for
potential blackmailers to hold out for gain. Consequently, de-
struction is typically motivated by sincere reasons, and is not
strategic. For this reason as well, there is less need for state in-
tervention with owners' decisions to destroy their property. Of
course it is not true that owners never hold on to unused land
or a copyright due to inertia or for strategic purposes. As a gen-
eral rule, though, nonuse of these assets is not a sufficiently re-
liable proxy for low valuation. Therefore, the costs of a use-it-
or-lose-it rule would outweigh its potential benefits.
C. CORRECTING DISTRIBUTIVE ERRORS
This Section completes the normative argument by high-
lighting an additional advantage of greater intervention with
respect to decisions by owners not to use their property: it
enables the correction of distributive errors, thus improving the
functioning of redistributive mechanisms.
Most people would agree that the state should enhance the
well-being of those who are worse off, and reduce inequality
among members of society. An ongoing debate, however, cen-
ters on the appropriate means to achieve this goal. Specifically,
scholars are divided on whether redistribution should be ac-
complished solely through taxes and transfer payments, or also
via legal rules, and in particular through the private law. 269
The former refers to methods such as progressive taxation, cash
assistance to needy families, social security and disability bene-
main name similar to the name of the plaintiff, one of the world's wealthiest
individuals, and ordered them to transfer the existing domain name to the
plaintiff. Id. at 614, 628. We may thus conclude that low valuation by right
holders is the main ground for intervention with cyberpiracy in names of indi-
viduals, and is one of the two major rationales for combating cyberpiracy in
trademarks.
269. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
147-56 (3d ed. 2003); Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on
Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistri-
bution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1093-1102 (1971); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redi-
stributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL. STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994); Chris William San-
chirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable
View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 797-98 (2000).
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fits. The latter refers to legal rules that do not form part of the
tax-and-transfer system, such as rules of property and contract
law.
A powerful argument against redistribution through pri-
vate law is grounded in economic considerations. It has been
claimed that legal rules are more costly and less effective at ac-
complishing welfare redistribution than tax-and-transfer
schemes, and that therefore distributive concerns should be
dealt with solely through taxes and transfer payments. 270 For
the purposes of this Article, the various economic arguments
and their critical counterarguments need not be analyzed. 271
One particular claim, though, is relevant for this discussion-
that of haphazard application.
Some writers argue that legal rules cannot be tailored as
carefully as taxes and transfer payments, and so they are fre-
quently under- or overinclusive. 272 A prime target of this charge
is landlord-tenant law, since the rules in this field are heavily
dominated by distributive concerns. Such rules, so the argu-
ment goes, will apply not only to wealthy landlords and poor
tenants, but also to landlords who are not affluent and tenants
who are well-off. Obviously, it is unreasonable to redistribute in
favor of those who are better off.273 A conventional response to
the haphazardness claim is that a similar problem hampers
successful redistribution through taxes and transfer pay-
ments. 274
270. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 8-10, 111-13; POLINSKY, supra
note 269, at 147-56; POSNER, supra note 15, at 505-07; Kaplow & Shavell, su-
pra note 269, at 505-07; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules
Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redi-
stributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821, 822-25 (2000); David A. Weisbach,
Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
446-53 (2003).
271. I have explored this issue in depth elsewhere. Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV.
326 (2006).
272. POLINSKY, supra note 269, at 154-55; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note
269, at 674-75; Weisbach, supra note 270, at 449.
273. POSNER, supra note 15, at 506 n.3; Rabin, supra note 86, at 560-62;
Daniel P. Schwallie, The Implied Warranty of Habitability as a Mechanism for
Redistributing Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 525,
531-32 (1990).
274. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE
L.J. 472, 502-03 (1980) (claiming that taxes may be as underinclusive as redi-
stributive contract rules); Chris W. Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Effi-
ciency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1051-56 (2001) (arguing that the
haphazardness of redistributive legal rules has been exaggerated, whereas the
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The problem of haphazard application should not lead to
the abandonment of redistribution through legal rules. What it
does require, however, is that we carefully choose those rules
that can adequately serve distributive goals.275 More impor-
tantly, we can craft redistributive legal rules in a way that
weeds out undeserving recipients. A good example is occupancy
requirements for rent-controlled housing.
As explained above, a tenant of a rent-controlled apart-
ment must reside in it, or else forfeit her right.276 Thus, actual
use is required from the rent-control tenant even though non-
use, in itself, does not harm the landlord and ensures less wear
and tear on the apartment. 277 Why, then, does the extreme
right to intensively use the apartment not include in it the
more moderate right to not use it?
A use requirement in this situation operates as a correct-
ing device. Rent-control legislation aims to protect low-income
tenants against displacement and homelessness by regulating
rent levels at below market levels and by restraining landlords'
powers of eviction.278 Ordinarily, tenants are an appropriate
target-group for redistribution. Unlike landlords, who have at
least one (and possibly more than one) additional apartment at
their disposal, tenants typically do not own another apartment
and do not rent more than one. Thus, ex ante, tenants seem to
be appropriate recipients of redistribution, which justifies the
creation of the legal rule in favor of their group. This generali-
zation, however, may prove to be wrong ex post, with respect to
specific tenants. Nonuse of a rent-controlled apartment is a
good proxy for mistaken redistribution. A nonoccupying tenant
has residence elsewhere, and so does not need the assistance of
rent-control laws to secure affordable housing. Furthermore,
since such a tenant has an additional home, we can no longer
haphazardness of taxes has been downplayed). Moreover, it has been found
that state and local taxes are often regressiue (rather than progressive).
MICHAEL P. ErLINGER ET AL., WHO PAYS? A DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
THE TAX SYSTEMS IN ALL 50 STATES (1996); David Brunori, The Limits of Jus-
tice: The Struggle for Tax Justice in the States, in TAX JUSTICE 193 (Joseph J.
Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry eds., 2002); Andrew Reschovsky, The Progres-
sivity of State Tax Systems, in THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION 161 (David
Brunori ed., 1998).
275. Compensation rules for regulatory takings of land are a good example
of rules that are unsuitable as a vehicle for redistribution. Lewinsohn-Zamir,
supra note 271, at 390-93.
276. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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assume that the landlord is better off than she is, and that the
landlord is an appropriate transferor of the redistribution
process.279 A use-it-or-lose-it rule in this context enables the
correction of clear distributive errors and mitigates the problem
of haphazard application.280
Similar reasoning applies to in-kind provision of social wel-
fare rights. Thus, for instance, disabled veterans are entitled to
services and assistance that will enable them to achieve maxi-
mum independence and obtain suitable employment. 28' To this
end, veterans may participate in a rehabilitation program (or-
dinarily, for a period of up to forty-eight months),28 2 that in-
cludes educational and psychological counseling, placement
services, vocational training and materials, and so forth.28 3
This entitlement, however, is subject to a time limitation. It
may not be afforded if twelve years have passed from the date
of the veteran's discharge. 284 In other words, nonuse of the wel-
fare right results in its loss, although nonuse, in itself, does not
harm the providing authorities. Why, then, not let the veteran
decide on the timing of the use? A plausible rationale for this
rule is the correction of distributive errors. Disabled veterans,
as a group, are an appropriate target group for redistribution.
This assumption, however, may prove to be wrong with respect
to specific individuals. A disabled veteran who has not applied
for rehabilitation assistance over the course of twelve years has
demonstrated by her behavior that she does not need the spe-
cial redistributive assistance. 28 5
279. The case of tenants of non-rent-controlled apartments is different. If
the apartment is not subject to rent control, then the tenant pays the market
rent. Wealth-in the form of regulated rent-is not transferred from the land-
lord to the tenant, and hence there is no need for a retroactive correction of a
redistributive error (for an explanation of the reason why, with respect to reg-
ular leases, there is less of a fear that tenants would hold on to unvalued
rights, see supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text).
280. The restrictions on subletting a rent-controlled apartment are further
intended to ensure that only individuals who do not have an alternative place
of residence will enjoy the distributive benefit. See supra note 90 and accom-
panying text. Our analysis of residency requirements in rent-controlled hous-
ing applies to occupancy requirements in subsidized housing programs as well.
Generally, such programs condition the provision of governmental subsidies
on nonvacancy of the units and their occupancy by low-income tenants. 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(9), (o)(13)(J) (2000); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 92, at 958.
281. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3100, 3102 (2000).
282. 38 U.S.C. § 3105(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2005).
283. 38 U.S.C. § 3104 (2000).
284. 38 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (2000 & Supp. III 2005).
285. This argument is supported by the exceptions to the twelve-year rule.
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Another example of a social welfare benefit that expires
with nonuse is the right to family leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act. 286 Under this law, certain employees are
entitled to a total of twelve weeks of leave during any twelve-
month period following the occurrence of certain events, such
as the birth of a child.28 7 This right expires "at the end of the
12-month period beginning on the date of such birth,"28 8 al-
though the employer is not hurt by the fact that a mother does
not use her entitlement during the child's first year, but wishes
to exercise it when the child is two years old. Once again, this
use-it-or-lose-it rule can be seen as a correcting device. The law
assumes that the first months following a child's birth are par-
ticularly demanding on parents, who therefore need special
consideration and assistance from their workplace. Parents
who do not take family leave during the entire year following
the birth of their child may reasonably be regarded as not need-
ing this benefit.
D. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Part II offered three reasons for rejecting the common wis-
dom that more is better than less and, consequently, for inter-
vening to a greater extent in the case of moderate-as opposed
to extreme-measures relating to property. The three reasons
are: protecting property transferees; reducing the incidence of
low-valuing owners; and correcting distributive errors. This
analysis leads to interesting conclusions and policy implica-
tions.
1. Conditioned Transfers
One general conclusion is that owners should be granted
more freedom to refrain from conveying a right than to transfer
it subject to restrictions. The analysis illustrated this claim in
two fields: donative transfers and landlord-tenant relations. 289
While current law grants potential donors considerable
freedom not to bestow their property at all, their freedom to
The time limitation does not apply, for instance, to veterans whose medical
condition prevented them from participating in a rehabilitation program. 38
U.S.C. § 3103(b)(1). By recognizing this (and other) exceptions, the law aims to
ensure that only veterans whose nonuse is a good proxy for not needing the
redistributive benefit are excluded from its coverage.
286. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
287. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A).
288. Id. § 2612(a)(2).
289. See supra Parts I.B.1 & II.A.
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transfer it subject to conditions is restricted. 290 The literature
has either condemned such rules altogether as conflicting with
the MBL rationale, or has relied on transaction costs to justify
intervention'in the limited sphere of dead-hand control. 291 This
Article, in contrast, suggests that the rules are not only justifi-
able but should equally apply to posthumous and inter vivos
controls. More property that is subject to restrictions may be
more detrimental to the transferees' long-term well-being than
less, unencumbered property, or even none.2 92 From this wel-
fare perspective, there is no material difference between post-
humous and inter vivos controls. Harmful conditions in both
types of transfers should be struck down.
Conditioned rights can be problematic for additional rea-
sons, as demonstrated by the example of restraints on aliena-
tion by tenants. Absolute prohibitions on assignment by te-
nants are enforceable even if arbitrary or capricious, whereas
moderate, conditional restrictions are subject to an objective
reasonableness requirement. 293 The justification for this un-
equal treatment is that absolute clauses are clear and unequi-
vocal, whereas conditioned clauses are subject to uncertainty
and open to misunderstanding. A rule holding conditioned
clauses to stricter standards protects its intended addressees
from confusion and reduces cognitive biases by giving an incen-
tive to draft clauses in unambiguous terms. 294
2. Naked Nonuse and Nonuse Plus
The analysis also establishes that, although nonuse of a
property right is ordinarily less burdensome to others than in-
tensive use of the right, nonuse should sometimes lead to the
loss of the property right. Use-it-or-lose-it rules are both effi-
cient and fair in circumstances where a significant period of
nonuse is a reliable indicator either of the low value owners
place on their property,295 or of a distributive error that re-
quires correction. 296 In particular, nonuse is a good proxy for
low value with respect to rights created for a specific, narrow
purpose that cannot be unilaterally altered by their holders,
290. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part II.A.1.
293. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part 1I.A.2.
295. See supra notes 224-32, 249-52 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 278-88 and accompanying text.
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and when holders have not paid the property's full market val-
ue.
297
The suggested rationale for not tolerating nonuse accounts
for the unequal treatment of different property rights. Whereas
some property rights are lost through naked nonuse, others are
subject to a nonuse plus regime, which requires additional ele-
ments besides nonutilization. The rationale explains why use-
it-or-lose-it rules are found in the context of trademarks but not
with respect to copyrights and patents;298 in the context of own-
ership of internet sites but not ownership of land;299 in domain
names speculation but not in land speculation; 300 in connection
with rent-controlled apartments but not in connection with
non-rent-controlled apartments. 30 1 At the same time, the dis-
cussion exposes the shortcomings of current servitudes law,
which mostly applies a nonuse plus rule. 30 2 According to this
Article's argument, naked nonuse is the preferable rule since
servitudes permit only a specific, narrow enjoyment of property
that cannot be unilaterally changed.
3. Destruction of Property
An additional conclusion is that the epitome of an extreme
measure with regard to one's property-its destruction-is gen-
erally less problematic than more moderate measures such as
nonuse, modification and alienation. A decision to destroy
property is less subject to inefficiencies than a resolution to
leave property unused. In contrast to nonuse, destruction can-
not be the product of neglect or lack of thought, and is an inef-
fective blackmailing device. 303 Furthermore, destruction deci-
sions are much less prone to cognitive biases than nonuse
choices. 304 Therefore, the hostility of courts and scholars to the
right to destroy one's property is unwarranted, and the fact
297. See supra notes 226-27, 249-51 and accompanying text. Evidence for
the low value placed on such rights may be found when the purpose that the
right was intended to serve is achieved by other means, or when the right
holder does not attempt to either assign the right or negotiate a change in its
scope.
298. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 217-20, 268 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
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that no general law prohibits the destruction of property is per-
fectly reasonable.
III. BEYOND PROPERTY LAW
This Article focuses on refutations of the "more is better
than less" argument in the law relating to private property,
particularly with respect to the relations between individuals
and their property rights. It has provided various justifications
for greater intervention in the case of moderate measures than
in the case of extreme ones. These justifications may be equally
applicable in other legal fields. Relevant examples may be
found in labor law, zoning law and contract law.
A. PREVENTING SEVERE HARM
Labor law abounds with MBL rationalizations, some of
which relate to the at-will employment regime. Employment at-
will permits an employer to terminate the contract with an em-
ployee without cause, 305 and is the generally accepted default
rule in the United States.306 It is argued, for instance, that if
employers were able to dismiss workers only for just cause,
then some potential workers (such as the young or the inexpe-
rienced) would not be hired at all.307 Stated differently, more
305. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404,
1405 (1967); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Econom-
ic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, 680
(1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1041, 1051 (1984); see also Clyde W. Summers, Individual-
sim, Collectivism and Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 453, 457-60 (2001) (describing cases upholding unjust discharges of
workers, including discharges for reporting on improper behavior by directors,
refusing to wear antiunion buttons or cut their hair, and expressing views in
favor of African-Americans' rights).
306. Blades, supra note 305, at 1416; Morriss, supra note 305, at 688-89,
699-700. True, almost all unionized employees are covered by collective
agreements that include protection against unjustified dismissal, but
unionized employees are but a small minority of United States workers. PAUL
C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 50, 72-73, 94, 105-06 (1990). Other countries, in contrast,
grant much wider protection against unjust discharge. Theodore J. St. An-
toine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full
Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 68 (1988) (stating that sixty countries around the
world protect workers from unfair discharge); Summers, supra note 6, at 508-
20 (discussing restrictions on dismissal without cause in France, Germany,
Sweden, and England).
307. John P. Frantz, Market Ordering Versus Statutory Control of Termi-
nation Decisions: A Case for the Inefficiency of Just Cause Dismissal Require-
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employment is better than less; the prospect of continuous em-
ployment is better than no employment. The natural conclusion
is that the law should not intervene in employment-at-will ar-
rangements. 308
Once we accept this rationale for an at-will regime, addi-
tional conclusions seem to follow. If an employer is entitled to
exercise the extreme measure of firing without a cause, does
this not also subsume a right to exercise the more moderate
measure of employing workers under any conditions, including,
for instance, payment of below-minimum wages? 309 Is not em-
ployment-albeit under inferior conditions-still preferable to
no employment at all? Moreover, should not such an employer
have the power to unilaterally change the contractual terms?
Since the employer can fire for any reason (or for no reason),
she could do so and condition reemployment on the signing of a
new contract which contains less favorable terms. In which
case, why not skip altogether the additional transaction costs
involved in firing and rehiring and recognize the legitimacy of
unilateral modification? 3 10
ments, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 573-74 (1997); Jeffrey L. Harrison,
The "New" Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost-
Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327, 336-37, 340-42, 345, 359 (1984);
Sunstein, supra note 305, at 1053, 1054 n.47 (noting that a "for cause" provi-
sion may harm newly hired employees and result in layoffs).
308. A similar argument is raised by Professor M. J. Trebilcock in his dis-
cussion of court intervention in the content of a standard form contract be-
tween a publishing company and a then-unknown composer. M. J. Trebilcock,
The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in
the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976). The court did not enforce
terms it held to be unfair and result from unequal bargaining power. Id. at
361. The contract transferred all present and future rights in the composer's
work to the company, did not require it to publish any of his works, and denied
him the right to terminate the contract. Id. at 361-64, 377, 379. Trebilcock cri-
ticizes this intervention in contractual freedom, reasoning that as a result
companies will sign on much fewer young, unknown, and therefore economi-
cally risky, composers. Id. at 382-83. Thus, Trebilcock also assumes that
"more" is better than "less" and that any contract (whose formation was not
infected with mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and the
like) is better than none.
309. See Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, with Im-
plications for Labor Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1749-50 (1996) (stating the
argument that minimum terms in labor contracts are inconsistent with the
doctrine of employment at-will). Hylton rejects the argument for different rea-
sons than the ones advanced in this Article. Id. at 1750-51, 1782. See also
Sunstein, supra note 305, at 1046 (stating that minimum wages might elimi-
nate jobs for the poorest workers).
310. See Katherine M. Apps, Good Faith Performance in Employment Con-
tracts: A "Comparative Conversation" Between the U.S. and England, 8 U. PA.
2008]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
This Article's answer to these arguments is that the MBL
rationale underlying them is inadequate. Thus, for instance,
the experience of being fired on a whim, without being deemed
worthy of any explanation, can be more injurious to workers'
long-term well-being than not being hired in the first place. The
dignity and self-respect of individuals, their ability to act auto-
nomously, as well as their reputation and esteem of their peers,
may suffer more through such summary termination of rela-
tions than if they had not been given the job.311 This state of af-
fairs was acknowledged by the demonstrators who flooded the
streets of France, 312 and may also be explained by the well-
known behavioral phenomenon that losses "hurt" more than
un-obtained gains of similar magnitude. 313 People may perceive
not being hired as an unrealized gain, but view being dis-
charged without cause as a loss. 3 14 Similar observations can be
made regarding the comparison of employment at-will with
employment under any conditions or unilateral modification of
contractual terms. Working under humiliating and degrading
work conditions-either from the outset of the contractual rela-
tionship or following unilateral changes to the existing con-
tract-can be worse in terms of personal welfare than not work-
ing in such an environment at all.3 15
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 883, 930 (2006) (questioning whether regulation of contract
modification becomes "practically meaningless" since "an employer is free to
terminate an employment relationship without notice and then offer reem-
ployment on different terms" and further noting that "an employer is also free
to threaten an employee with total termination without reengagement if the
new terms are not agreed to").
311. For a discussion of the effect of extreme and moderate measures on
well-being, see supra notes 147-79 and accompanying text. See also Jedediah
S. Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-
Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1110-16 (2007) (arguing
that the goals of relative equality in interdependence and human flourishing
should structure the allowable terms of recruitment in labor relationships);
Singer, supra note 180, at 5-7 (justifying the regulation of minimal standards
in contracts by the idea of a free and democratic society).
312. See Sciolino & Smith, supra note 1; Smith, supra note 1; see also supra
notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
315. Note that employers would not necessarily react to minimal contract
terms (such as minimum wages or prohibition on unilateral modification of the
contract) by reducing employment. See, e.g., David Card, Do Minimum Wages
Reduce Employment? A Case Study of California, 1987-89, 46 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 38, 43-46, 52-53 (1992) (relying on empirical data to prove that an
increase in California's minimum wage did not cause a decline in the employ-
ment of young and less-skilled workers); Harrison, supra note 307, at 332-36,
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Similar reasoning is relevant to some suggested solutions
to the problem of exclusionary zoning. Public land-use controls
can serve as an exclusionary device, for instance, by requiring
minimum lot sizes and types of residential structures that only
wealthy people can afford. 316 Excluding low-income families
from living in certain neighborhoods, with the resultant con-
centration of poverty in other neighborhoods, have negative so-
cial effects. 317 One novel solution, adopted by the New Jersey
legislature, was to require each municipality in the state to
provide a "fair share" of low-income housing,3 18 but then to
permit municipalities to trade up to fifty percent of this "fair
share" obligation by paying another municipality to accept ad-
ditional low-income housing units for a negotiated price. 319 This
359 (arguing that requiring a cause for discharging employees may result in a
reduction in wages); Sunstein, supra note 305, at 1046-47, 1052-53 (explain-
ing that minimal terms may result in lower salaries). An employer may prefer,
for example, to forgo the possibility of unilateral modification rather than to
bear the costs of firing and rehiring under new terms. In other words, the pro-
hibition on unilateral alteration may ensure introduction only of new terms
that are extremely important to the employer, in particular, terms whose val-
ue justifies firing and rehiring. For an elaboration of this argument in the con-
text of conditioned transfers, see supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
In addition, even if employers respond to minimal contract terms by reducing
salaries of workers earning above-minimum wages, it may still be the case
that overall welfare is enhanced. The welfare increase from eliminating par-
ticularly harmful working conditions may surpass the welfare decrease from
lowering wages. Interestingly, an empirical study has found that employees
generally (albeit erroneously) believe that they can be fired only for just cause.
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105,
110-11, 131-40 (1997). Accordingly, one cannot state with confidence that the
great incidence of at-will contracts is due to the fact that workers prefer this
regime to a for-cause regime with lower wages.
316. For instance, a zoning ordinance that bans multifamily dwellings and
permits only construction of single-family units on large lots. Patrick Field et
al., Trading the Poor: Intermunicipal Housing Negotiation in New Jersey, 2
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997).
317. See Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
1227, 1227-28 & nn.1-2 (2006) (explaining the detrimental effects of concen-
trated poverty on education, safety, and overall life chances of children).
318. See Mark A. Hughes & Therese J. McGuire, A Market for Exclusion:
Trading Low-Income Housing Obligations Under Mount Laurel III, 29 J. URB.
ECON. 207, 208-10 (1991) (explaining how each municipality's "fair share" is
calculated).
319. Field et al., supra note 316, at 1-2, 9-12 (describing the new legisla-
tion and actual agreements struck between municipalities under it); Harold A.
McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation for Exclusionary
Zoning, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 665, 679-82 (1987) (explaining the New Jersey legisla-
tion). Studies have found, for instance, that "wealthier, predominantly white
communities pay poorer, more densely populated and more racially diverse
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creative housing scheme was criticized on various grounds, in-
cluding leaving the concerned low-income households out of the
negotiations. 320 By not involving them in the process, so the ar-
gument went, the municipalities were treating these people as
unwanted objects to be traded away, instead of as autonomous
individuals. 321 In addition, agreements that are struck between
the municipalities alone might harm the poor.322 If low-income
households are made party to the negotiations, their prefe-
rences will be heard and taken into consideration, and they
could share in the compensation paid in exchange for relocating
low-income housing.
According to this Article's thesis, greater involvement of
the poor in the negotiations might not improve matters, but ra-
ther might make them worse. True, at first glance, participa-
tion in the decision-making process and compensation for ex-
clusion seem to be in the interests of the poor. A complete
prohibition on exclusion is hard to enforce, whereas voluntary
agreements to exclude for a price might be workable. Put diffe-
rently, compensated exclusion is better than uncompensated
exclusion-more is better than less. This conclusion, however,
is unwarranted. Negotiated compensation (both to the excluded
households and to the receiving communities) stigmatizes the
individuals concerned and legitimizes (and possibly perpe-
tuates) an undesirable phenomenon. Specifically, compensation
formally labels low-income households as a burden to others.
True, even implicit, uncompensated exclusion can convey the
message that "you are not wanted here." Nevertheless, com-
pensation conveys a still more hurtful message, namely, "we
don't want you so much that we are even willing to pay you to
communities to assume the wealthy communities' affordable housing obliga-
tions." Field et al., supra note 316, at 11. Similar data was observed in another
empirical study of this novel market. Hughes & McGuire, supra note 318, at
211-15. Hughes and McGuire state that "[tihe conventional point of view is
that lower-income housing units are being traded. Our view is that it is the
right to exclude lower-income households that is being traded." Id. at 216. The
negotiated price for the right to exclude will range between the transferring
municipality's maximum willingness to pay to exclude and the receiving muni-
cipality's minimum cost of housing construction. Id. at 211.
320. Fennell, supra note 317, at 1269 & n.140.
321. Id. at 1274.
322. McDougall, supra note 319, at 683-84 (explaining that the interests of
the poor will not receive sufficient weight in agreements to which they are not
privy).
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go away. ' 323 Thus, compensation in this context may have a
particularly harmful effect on the welfare of the poor. 324 Fur-
thermore, granting compensation may transform the act of ex-
clusion from a shameful activity to a socially acceptable prac-
tice.325 In conclusion, welfare may be further promoted if we
eliminate the trading mechanism and better enforce the muni-
cipalities' "fair share" obligations.
B. PREVENTING MISTAKES AND MISCONCEPTIONS
Yet another refutation of the MBL argument is found with
respect to consumer product warranties. The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act 326 re-
quires suppliers of consumer products327 who provide a written
warranty, to expressly indicate whether it is "full" or "li-
mited."328 Only a full warranty must meet the federal minimum
standards for warranties, 329 which entitle the consumer to re-
medy a defective product without charge by repair, replace-
323. Hughes and McGuire have found that prices ranged between $20,000
to $27,500 per unit of low-income housing. Hughes & McGuire, supra note
318, at 213. Furthermore, they report on a case where taxpayers of one muni-
cipality agreed to pay an additional $800 per year for six years to help finance
the transfer of forty-five housing units to another municipality. Id.
324. This is true even if the affected individuals do not oppose the trade in
the right to exclude them. For detailed explanation, see supra notes 164-79
and accompanying text.
325. Morris Cohen offers similar reasons for noncompensation of slave
owners after slavery was abolished. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereign-
ty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927), reprinted in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 61-62
(1933). In this respect, trade in the right to exclude, is very different from
trade in emission permits between air polluters. Although the latter offers
firms a choice between complying with air quality standards and purchasing a
pollution permit from other firms, it does not cause stigmatization or perpetu-
ation of condemnable social practices. For discussion of tradable pollution
permits see, for example, James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25
U. TOL. L. REV. 449, 452-54 (1994), and Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of
Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83
MINN. L. REV. 129, 163-66 (1998). In contrast, Fennell notes that norms
against exclusion may produce a "shaming control," which would limit munici-
palities' willingness to offer high prices for the right to exclude. Fennell, supra
note 317, at 1274-75. At the same time, she acknowledges that compensation
by excluders might be viewed as acceptably complying with the antiexclusion
norm. Id.
326. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000).
327. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act defines a consumer product as
"any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is
normally used for personal, family or household purposes." Id. § 2301(1).
328. Id. § 2303(a).
329. Id. §§ 2303(a)(1)-(2), 2304.
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ment, or refund.3 30 In addition, a full warranty cannot condition
these remedies on the fulfillment by consumers of any duty
other than notification, unless the supplier proves that such a
duty is reasonable.331 One example of an unreasonable duty is
requiring the consumer to return a registration card as a condi-
tion for securing warranty performance.33 2
These rules conflict with the MBL rationale, since extreme
disclaimers of warranties are permissible, whereas more mod-
erate conditioning of warranty remedies are not. A supplier
need not provide a written warranty at all, and in this case the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not restrict her power to disclaim any
warranties. 333 Furthermore, even if a supplier decides to give a
written warranty, it may easily evade the federal minimum
standards by designating it as a limited warranty.334 In both
cases, the supplier need not prove that the restrictions or dis-
claimers on warranty remedies are reasonable. 335 By contrast,
if the supplier demonstrates more consideration for the con-
sumers' interests and provides a broader warranty, it will be
330. Id. § 2304(a), (d), (e); see also Jonathan A. Eddy, Effects of the Mag-
nusson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C. L. REV. 835,
863-65 (1977).
331. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1).
332. 16 C.F.R. § 700.7 (2007) (interpreting the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act). Another example of an unreasonable obligation is conditioning the repair
of a defective boat on returning it to a factory on the opposite coast. Eddy, su-
pra note 330, at 865.
333. Ducharme v. A&S RV Center, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 843, 854 (E.D.
Mich. 2004) (holding that the Magnuson-Moss Act did not apply when the sel-
ler of a motor home did not offer an express warranty and disclaimed all im-
plied warranties); Mitsch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 833 N.E.2d 936, 939-40 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005) (stating that a buyer of a used vehicle could not recover from
the dealer under the Magnuson-Moss Act when a disclaimer contained in the
purchase agreement stated that the vehicle was sold "as is," without any war-
ranty, either express or implied); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS § 4.29, at 613 (3d ed. 2004); Annotation, Consumer Product War-
ranty Suits in Federal Court Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, 59 A.L.R. FED. 461, 464-65 (1982) ("Under the
Act, no seller is forced to give an express written warranty, but if one is of-
fered, it must comply with the standards set forth in the law.").
334. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2); Gilbert v. Monaco Coach Corp. 352 F. Supp. 2d
1323, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (holding that warranties specifically designated as
"limited" are not required to meet minimum standards set forth in the Magnu-
son-Moss Act); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 333, § 4.29, at 612-13; Eddy, supra
note 330, at 862.
335. See Richard H. Matthews, A Guide to Federal Warranty Legislation-
The Magnuson-Moss Act, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 163, 171 (1976) (describing the
reasonableness requirement and stating that a warranty not complying with it
can still be valid if designated as a limited warranty).
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subject to greater scrutiny and intervention. A reasonableness
standard will apply, and with it the risk that conditions and re-
strictions will be invalidated. 336 The harsher legal treatment of
full warranties may motivate suppliers either to offer a limited
warranty or not to provide a written warranty at all. Both reac-
tions result in a lesser contractual right for consumers.
Nevertheless, this rejection of the MBL rationale is perfect-
ly justifiable. As with the example of restrictions on alienation
by tenants discussed above, 337 stricter standards for full war-
ranties are designed to prevent consumer confusion and mis-
takes. A contract that does not provide a warranty or that con-
spicuously provides only a limited warranty, is much clearer
than a contract that supposedly grants a full warranty but then
subjects it to unreasonable conditions. With respect to the lat-
ter, consumers may mistakenly believe that they would be able
to enjoy the warranty and fulfill its conditions, whereas in fact
there is little practical difference between having no right from
the outset and having an unreasonably conditioned right that
is difficult to meet.338 The cognitive bias of overoptimism con-
firms the likelihood of such mistakes. 339 In addition, absence of
a warranty will be perceived by consumers as an unobtained
gain, whereas nonenjoyment of a conditioned warranty will be
viewed as a loss. As inflicted losses "hurt" more than unob-
tained gains of similar magnitude, upholding unreasonable
conditions would exacerbate the injury to consumers who can-
not enjoy a certain warranty. 340 Imposing a reasonableness
standard on conditioned full warranties serves as a debiasing
device in favor of consumers, by encouraging suppliers to clear-
336. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1).
337. See supra Part II.A.2.
338. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
339. For detailed explanation, see supra notes 189-93 and accompanying
text. I believe that this reasoning also explains section 2-316(1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), which holds that negation or limitation of an express
warranty is inoperative to the extent that it cannot be reasonably read as con-
sistent with the warranty. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2007). Accordingly, courts rou-
tinely invalidate disclaimers that negate express warranties. See Debra L.
Goetz et al., Special Project: Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transac-
tions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1259 (1987). Thus, "[a] drafter
who makes an undertaking in one breath and seeks to retract it in the next
breath has usually wasted breath the second time." 1 FARNSWORTH, supra
note 333, § 4.29a, at 615. If a seller wishes to exclude warranties, she should
not appear to provide them in the first place, as to do so would confuse buyers.
340. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
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ly choose between two options: restricted (or no) warranties and
broad warranties. 341
C. REDUCING THE INCIDENCE OF LOW-VALUING RIGHT
HOLDERS
The contract law doctrine of "course of performance," ac-
cording to which the conduct of the parties in the course of per-
forming their contract bears on its interpretation, provides an
example of this final reason for rejecting the MBL rationale.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) states that if a sales con-
tract involves repeated occasions for performance, and one par-
ty knowingly, and despite opportunity for objection, accepts or
acquiesces in a course of performance deviating from the con-
tractual terms, then such course of performance may be re-
garded as waiver or modification of any contractual term incon-
sistent with it.342 More than one occasion of nonobjection is
required before inferring a waiver or alteration of the contract's
provisions. 343 Scholars agree that according to this rule a
course of performance can vary even express terms, 344 and that
the UCC does not condition the rule on the ambiguity of the
contractual language. 345 Thus, for example, if a buyer is en-
titled to receive seven shipments of goods on certain dates or at
a specific location, but has accepted three times, and without
objection, late delivery or delivery at a different location, then
341. For further explanation, see supra notes 199-203 and accompanying
text. A caveat is in order. I do not take a stand on whether consumer protec-
tion legislation should take the form of disclosure requirements or directly
control the contractual terms themselves. American legislatures have usually
favored the former type of regulation. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 333,
§ 4.29, at 611. For the purposes of my thesis, it suffices to argue that if we opt
for disclosure, then we should also insist that contractual terms be clear and
not confusing. The reasonableness requirement in the Magnuson-Moss Act
achieves this purpose, as explained above.
342. U.C.C. § 1-303(a), (d), (f) (incorporating the doctrine formerly found in
U.C.C. § 2-208(1), (3)).
343. The UCC requires "a sequence of conduct" between the parties and an
agreement involving "repeated occasions for performance." U.C.C. § 1-303(a).
Courts have held that two acts may constitute a course of performance. Nana-
kuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 794 (9th Cir. 1981).
344. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 333, § 7.13, at 330; JAMES J. WHITE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-6, at 60 (5th ed. 2000);
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1782-84
(1996).
345. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 333, § 7.13, at 330.
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course of performance may alter the contract.346 Consequently,
the buyer will not be able to insist that the delivery of the re-
maining four shipments adhere to the original terms. The
common explanation for the doctrine is that the parties' con-
duct during performance is the best indicator of their actual in-
tentions and of the modifications they have agreed to.3 47 By
adopting this doctrine, the UCC facilitates flexible and informal
adjustments of contractual obligations.
This Article offers a different explanation for the doctrine,
one which lends it additional support. Course of performance is
a use-it-or-lose-it rule: contractual rights that are not exercised
during the contract's performance should be lost, because non-
use in these circumstances is a good proxy for low valuation of
the right by its holder.348 When a party repeatedly fails to "use"
a right that grants it a specific, narrow entitlement (such as de-
livery on a certain date or at a specific location), the party sig-
nals that it values such right to a lesser extent than the other
party values its modification (for example, the new date or loca-
tion for delivery as evidenced by the course of performance).
This conclusion is supported by the fact that the cost of avoid-
ing this legal outcome is extremely low: 349 the right holder need
only verbally communicate her objection to the course of per-
formance. 350 Thus, the UCC rule reduces the incidence of low-
valuing right owners, while at the same time saving on the
transaction costs to the parties of negotiating contract modifi-
cations. This justification for the course of performance doctrine
is pertinent even when the traditional explanation-that
346. See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in
Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 790-91 (1999) (discussing such ex-
amples as late payments and late delivery dates).
347. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 333, § 7.13, at 329-32; Omri Ben-Shahar,
The Erosion of Rights by Past Breach, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 190, 197-98
(1999) (stating the traditional rationalization); David V. Snyder, Language
and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct,
54 SMU L. REV. 617, 643 (2001) (supporting the conventional view).
348. See supra notes 224-32, 249-51 and accompanying text.
349. Cf. Ben-Shahar, supra note 347, at 192-94, 216-17, 223-27, 234 (ar-
guing, generally, that people will react to doctrines that erode their rights as a
result of past breach by taking measures to enforce their rights, unless the
cost of such enforcement outweighs the value of the rights).
350. U.C.C. § 1-303(a)(2) (2007) (stating that courts will infer course of per-
formance only if the other party "accepts the performance or acquiesces in it
without objection"); Ian Ayres, Eroding Entitlements as Litigation Commit-
ment, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 836, 838-39 (1999).
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course of performance is the best indication of the parties' in-
tentions-does not apply.351
CONCLUSION
Oliver Twist, one of Dickens's memorable characters, was
an orphan raised in the infamous workhouses of nineteenth
century England.3 52 Oliver's childhood was pure misery, as he
was starved, beaten, and unloved. Although meek and mild by
nature and by circumstance, Oliver summoned up the courage
to ask for an additional helping of gruel. "He rose from the ta-
ble; and advancing to the master, basin and spoon in hand,
said: somewhat alarmed at his own temerity: 'Please, sir, I
want some more. ' ' 35 Following this outrageous request, Oliver
was turned out of the workhouse and forced to learn to survive
in a brutal world.
Would it not have been better if Oliver had been given more
food? Of course; no one can deny it. I do not claim that "less" is
always or usually better than "more." Indeed, having more of
something is ordinarily better than having less of it, and a cer-
tain minimum amount of property is necessary for people to be
able to fare even modestly well. Property in excess of this min-
imum can raise individuals' level of well-being by affording
them greater freedom from others, more opportunities for ac-
quiring knowledge, additional means for pursuing long-term
351. Moreover, the alternative justification is further supported by an in-
fluential criticism of the course of performance doctrine. Professor Lisa
Bernstein has argued that course of performance reflects the "relationship-
preserving" norms that govern an ongoing relationship of contractual parties,
whereas the written contract expresses their intended "end-game" norms, ap-
plicable when the relationship deteriorates into litigation. Bernstein, supra
note 344, at 1796-98. If, so the argument goes, courts used course of perfor-
mance to alter express terms, then parties would be reluctant to accommodate
one another even when their relationship is still good. They would fear that
concessions on their part would be later construed as modifying the explicit
terms. Consequently, the parties will insist on rigid compliance with formal
contractual provisions. Id. at 1808-11. For the purposes of this Article, I need
not take a stand on whether the course of performance doctrine would on the
whole advance or impede the goal of flexible adjustment of contracts. Regard-
less of whether the doctrine will eventually apply to many or few cases, in
those instances where a party does not object to a different course of perfor-
mance, despite being familiar with the doctrine and despite the availability of
easy means to avoid its application, the reasonable conclusion is that the right
has low value for her.
352. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 1 (Broadview Encore Editions,
2005) (1846).
353. Id. at 9.
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goals and more possibilities for enjoyment. Although it may be
argued that beyond a certain amount of property welfare ceases
to increase (or increases only marginally),354 it may still be true
that welfare does not decrease from acquiring the additional
property.
If MBL arguments were clearly and generally false, there
would be no need to discuss them. Rather, since they may be
correct, it is doubly important to guard against their allure.
This Article claimed that in several different legal contexts
more is not better than less, and that therefore moderate
measures should be less tolerated and more restricted than ex-
treme ones. It analyzed the normative justifications for this
counterintuitive idea, and provided guidelines for identifying
mistaken applications of the MBL argument. The fruitfulness
of the suggested justifications was demonstrated in property
law and in other legal fields, concluding that "more is better
than less" rationales should be treated with suspicion. They
should be scrutinized carefully' rather than uncritically em-
braced.
354. HURKA, supra note 170, at 171-75.
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